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featuring firm-specific shocks to production. I map these shocks into a unique, hand-built network of firm-
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the chains. Surprisingly, contrary to prediction by typical network theories, these firm-specific shocks impact
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new approach to quantify the economic and policy content of Federal Reserve communications by dissecting
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting minutes into distinct economic topics, and
simultaneously extract the tone and uncertainty level of each topic. We use market reaction to objectively
assess the relative informativeness of each topic, and we find significant incremental informational value from
the topic contents, despite that the minutes are released several weeks after the original meetings.
Furthermore, we find evidence consistent of the Fed possessing superior information, which is then
transmitted to the market through the language of the minutes.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE INTERFACE BETWEEN FINANCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Di Wu
Itay Goldstein
Amir Yaron
In the first chapter “Shock Spillover and Financial Response in Supply Chain Networks:
Evidence from Firm-Level Data”, using machine learning methods on firm-level textual
disclosures, I construct a large-scale dataset featuring firm-specific shocks to production. I
map these shocks into a unique, hand-built network of firm-level supply chain connections
to empirically quantify how these localized shocks affect remote firms along the chains.
Surprisingly, contrary to prediction by typical network theories, these firm-specific shocks
impact the revenue of firms even up to 4 connections away from the origins. This pronounced
spillover effect is explained by three features–uneven distribution of monopolistic power,
variations in supplier substitutability, and different inventory levels–that are salient in the
data but usually not present in existing models. In addition, firms seem to respond to these
spillovers by increasing their working capital and financial leverage. Moreover, the stock
market reacts to shock spillovers from distant connections with slower speeds: post-shock
abnormal returns are persistently negative for up to 40 days.
In the second chapter “Deciphering Fedspeak: The Information Content of FOMC Meet-
ings”, we present a new approach to quantify the economic and policy content of Federal Re-
serve communications by dissecting the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting
minutes into distinct economic topics, and simultaneously extract the tone and uncertainty
level of each topic. We use market reaction to objectively assess the relative informative-
ness of each topic, and we find significant incremental informational value from the topic
contents, despite that the minutes are released several weeks after the original meetings.
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Furthermore, we find evidence consistent of the Fed possessing superior information, which
is then transmitted to the market through the language of the minutes.
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CHAPTER 1 : Shock Spillover and Financial Response in Supply Chain Networks:
Evidence from Firm-Level Data
1.1. Introduction
The most prevalent type of inter-firm relationships is the physical network of supply chains.
Its large scale and complex, changing structure is evident from Figure 1.1, which plots a
slice of the network between the 400 largest firms in the tech industry in 2002 and 2015.
With globalization, supply chains have become even longer, denser, and more clustered.
The additional verticalities introduced by these deeper firm-level interconnections remains
unexplored, as typical studies on spillovers and externalities in finance focus on the existence
of externalities and their effects on firms’ direct connections. By contrast, we have limited
information on the extent of these externalities, measured by how deep they penetrate along
the linkages to remote connections beyond the direct linkages.
This paper directly quantifies the extent of these externality spillovers: I hand-build two
firm-level datasets to empirically examine the economic effect of firm-specific production
shocks on the origin firms’ remote customers along the supply chain, beyond their direct,
tier-1 connections. I then explore the implications of this remote spillover for the stock
prices and corporate policies of firms further down the chains.
While there are many recent theoretical papers on the aggregation of shocks through pro-
duction interconnections such as Acemoglu et al. (2012), Gabaix (2011), and Kelly et al.
(2013), little empirical evidence exists on their firm-to-firm implications due to the lack
of well identified data on firm-specific shocks, and the lack of granular data on firm-level
networks of supply relationships.1 This paper contributes two new datasets to address these
limitations in identification and measurement. Specifically, I first build a 20-year database
of over 8,000 firm-specific production shocks of a large variety of types and firms. I identify
1Existing data is either sector level, such as the make-use tables aggregated by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA), or only capture a small fraction of relationships between small suppliers and very large
customers, such as the Compustat Segments database.
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these shocks through a topic-based textual analysis of over 5 million individual firm disclo-
sures. This allows for well-identified, firm-level empirical examinations. I then map these
shocks into a 20-year network of over 1 million supply chain relationships between publicly
traded firms globally. I construct this firm-level supply chain network from the disclosure
data and three other public and proprietary data sources. Tracing the exact origin of each
shock to the network, I directly examine if these firm-specific, idiosyncratic shocks spill over
along the linkages. I measure their impact on the economic outcomes, corporate policies,
and stock prices of origin firms, their closest connections, and remote firms beyond the
first-tier connections.
I find several new results. First, although typical theories on production networks predict
that firm-specific shocks quickly decay after the first link, I document that, surprisingly,
these shocks cause substantial impact to firms even up to 4 connections away from the
origin: on average, an idiosyncratic shock that causes 1% decline in revenue growth for the
origin firms causes 0.82% decline for their closest connections, but also causes 1.03%, 0.87%,
and 0.40% decline for 2nd, 3rd, and 4th-tier connections.
I then demonstrate that the data exhibit three salient features, which are absent from
typical theories, yet are particularly conducive to such prolonged and pronounced shock
spillovers. First, (monopolistic) market powers are unevenly distributed along the supply
chains. Firms located further away from origins tend to have lower market power, thus are
less able to change prices to their customers, and at the same time face higher-powered
suppliers who are more able to raise prices and pass more impact onto them. This dual
price-quantity effect causes larger impact and longer spillovers than predicted by models
with perfectly competitive firms. Second, the substitutability of suppliers and third, the
level of inventories, also vary along the supply chains. These factors can also significantly
affect the magnitude of spillovers. I first establish the validity of these channels through
firm-level tests, where I show that they are indeed significantly related to the impact of
spilled-over shocks. I then provide the network-level evidence for the market power channel
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by documenting that firms further down the supply chains have lower average market power.
Next, I develop a series of robustness checks to solidify the results’ internal and external va-
lidities. First, although the distinguishing feature of the shock data is that they are derived
from firm-specific disclosures, one still needs to verify that they do not have systematic
causes (i.e. caused by macroeconomic fluctuations), nor systematic effects (i.e. their ini-
tial impact hits only the origin firm). During data construction, the shock disclosures are
classified by a Bayesian topic model called Latent Dirichlet Analysis (LDA). This results in
multiple, distinct types of causes, from natural disasters (earthquakes, floods), to produc-
tion glitches (machine breakdowns), etc. I examine the impact of each category at a time, as
well as a sub-category consisting of only localized plant fires, and find similar results across
categories. This confirms that the sample is not contaminated by shocks with potentially
systematic effects and that most shocks from my data are indeed localized. Second, firms
might only report the largest shocks, leading to overstatement in coefficient estimates. I
use the exogenous enactment of a much stricter SOX-Act provision to rule this case out.
Third, I conduct a series of falsification tests to ensure that the shocks are indeed correctly
mapped to the network data. A host of tests for other issues such as strategic reporting,
the role of private firms, etc are discussed in the text.
Having documented the main economic facts, I then explore the stock market implications
of these long spillovers. I first document that prices are quickly adjusted for firms with their
own shocks or shocks from a directly connected supplier, with a two-day abnormal return
of -3.98%. However, if the shock is originated from further up the supply chains, then the
market response, while still big in magnitude, is much slower in speed: there is a persistent
drift in returns for up to 40 days. Exploiting variations of my shock data where some shocks
are disclosed by firms themselves while others are disclosed by their indirect connections, I
demonstrate that information processing constraints, perhaps similar to those uncovered by
Cohen and Lou (2012), are likely responsible for this slow reaction, giving rise to potentially
profitable trading opportunities for investors more adept at analyzing the complex structure
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of supply chains.
My final set of tests explores the responses from corporate policies and capital structure to
shock spillovers. To do so, I first examine the languages of 10-K/Qs from the same firms
that disclose shocks and uncover a series of policies that firms say they would adjust. I
then empirically test whether firms actually do adjust these policies and the intensity of
such adjustments. My evidence suggests that, after shock spillovers, firms increase their
inventories, cash holdings and capital expenditures. I then show that this response is much
larger to shocks originated from more closely connected sources, than from more remote
firms up the supply chains.
This paper contributes to the literature on four fronts. First, a burgeoning literature in
finance explores spillovers and externalities along various types of interconnections related
to personnel (Shue (2013), Cohen et al. (2008), Cohen et al. (2010), Maturana and Nickerson
(2015)), geography (Poll et al. (2015)), trading, financing and insurance (Cohen-Cole et al.
(2014), Bajo et al. (2015), Billio et al. (2012), Afonso et al. (2015)), product (Hoberg
and Phillips (2015), Rauh and Sufi (2012), Foucault and Fresard (2014)), supply chain
(Barrot and Sauvagnat (2014), Titman and Wessels (1988), Banerjee et al. (2008), Fee
et al. (2006), Hennessy and Livdan (2009)), or internal connections within conglomerates
(Schoar (2002)), and the effect of these externalities on firm behaviors. A large body of
literature in operation management, such as Anupindi and Akella (1993), Tomlin (2006),
and Ang et al. (2014), focus on how to mitigate these externalities operationally. However,
little is known about the extent of these externalities in terms of how deep their effect can
penetrate along connections. This paper builds upon this literature by directly quantifying
the extent of these externalities according to how far they propagate vertically down the
supply chain linkages. I demonstrate that, at the micro level, these externalities spill over
much deeper beyond just one firm, with their effect reaching up to the 4th connection in
some cases. Therefore, at the macro level, the aggregate effects are potentially even larger
than existing studies suggest.
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This paper also contributes to the literature on the identification and measurement of
firm-specific shocks and their propagation. Existing studies in finance and operations man-
agement have examined shocks in the context of bankruptcies (Hertzel et al. (2008), Kolay
and Lemmon (2011)), financial distress (Hortaçsu et al. (2013)), natural disasters and tem-
perature variations (Barrot and Sauvagnat (2014), Boehm et al. (2014), and Bergman et al.
(2015)), and supply disruptions (Hendricks and Singhal (2005)). Moreover, Leary and
Roberts (2014) identify shocks by extracting the idiosyncratic components of equity returns
using asset pricing models. Giovanni et al. (2014) employ a similar approach in extracting
the idiosyncratic component of firm sales. Other papers, such as Strebulaev and Whited
(2011) and Gourio (2008), recover such shocks with structural models on firm production
and investment. However, so far we have limited information on the exact nature of those
shocks. This paper builds upon this literature with a different source of data. With the
actual texts of firm disclosures and news, I directly observe the actual events behind the
shocks. This direct way of capturing the source of idiosyncratic production shocks results in
additional granularities that are helpful not only for identification, but also for the precise
measurement of economic magnitudes of a wide variety of shocks in other contexts as well
(e.g. financing shocks or systematic shocks).
Moreover, this paper complements existing work on asset pricing and shock aggregation
in production networks. Compared to sector-level studies on aggregate volatilities and
production networks such as Ahern (2012) and Foerster et al. (2011), this paper directly
captures firm-specific production shocks, thus enriches the firm-level microfoundations of
shock aggregation. This paper complements the work on correlated supplier-customer stock
returns, such as Cohen and Frazzini (2008) and Menzly and Ozbas (2010), by measuring
the response of stock returns directly to firm-specific production shocks.
Finally, the empirical results on the link between market power and shock spillovers provide
motivation for future theory developments on production networks that incorporate richer
sets of frictions such as monopolistic competition, and the asset pricing relationship between
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the spillover effects and network-related systematic risks and expected stock returns. I
explore some of these issues in related works.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes my sample and data
sources. Section 1.3 reports the empirical results on shock spillover in the supply chain
network, and their effect on firms’ revenue, cash flows, and gross margins. It also isolates
several factors that could give rise to, and affect the magnitude of, these spillovers. A series
of key robustness tests immediately follow in Section 1.4 to ensure the validity of these
spillover results. Then, Section 1.5 discusses the responses, from both managers and the
stock market, to these spillovers. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2. Data and Identification
I derive the main empirical inferences in this paper by mapping a hand-collected, 20-year
dataset of firm-specific idiosyncratic shocks into a hand-built dataset of firm-to-firm supply
relations between publicly traded firms globally. This section describes my methodology
to construct these datasets. A more in-depth review of the data construction methodology
can be found in Appendix A.1.2.2
1.2.1. Firm-Specific Idiosyncratic Shocks
Data Sources and Initial Sample Selection
Using a two-step textual analysis technique, I extract data on firm-level idiosyncratic shocks
from the language of corporate disclosures and news. The first step extracts the list of supply
shocks from these texts, and the second step isolates the firm specific, idiosyncratic ones
from the first list. For the first step, I download and process the texts produced between
1994 and 2015 from the following sources:
1. SEC Form 8-Ks filed in the EDGAR system: In addition to regularly scheduled disclo-
sures such as 10-K/Qs, public companies in the United States are required to report
2Please contact the author if interested in using the described data for research purposes.
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a wide variety of material corporate events on a more timely basis, in the form of
8-K filings, or “current reports.” Such disclosures were optional but became manda-
tory following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Correspondingly, many firms
disclose a wide variety of supply chain-related events and disruptions in their 8-Ks.
Additionally, exact event dates are included in HTML headers accompanying the main
filings. I parse these data from the headers and merge them with the main texts to
create one unique date-stamped, item-coded text string per 8-K filing. The filing
firm’s identity is included in the SEC’s Central Index Key (CIK), which I merge with
GVKEY from Compustat.
2. Press releases filed through the Dow Jones Newswire: I obtain the main texts of each
release and match the name of the disclosing firm back to Compustat.
3. Company-specific news from Capital IQ: this includes most firm-related news in a
time-stamped, machine readable format.
For each text document in the above list, Step 1 of the textual analysis uses a set of keyword
filters that captures events containing keywords from the following groups:
• Supply chains: supplier, supply chain, shipment, raw material, etc;
• Events: disruption, shortage, delay, etc;
• Shocks: unexpected, sudden, shocks, etc;
Specific keyword filters can be found in Appendix A.1.2. This step results in a set of 24,838
events corresponding to supply-related shocks. For 19,771 of such shocks, I can identify
the exact origin of the shock by iteratively searching the texts for the list of all known
firm names extracted from Bloomberg. Of these shocks, 14,043 (71.03%) are shocks to
the disclosing firm itself and 5,728 (28.97%) are disclosed as a supply shock from a named
supplier firm. In the former case, the origin of the shock is identified as the disclosing firm
itself. This distinction proves useful for a key robustness check in Section 1.4.1.
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Classification of Shocks by Type
The second step of the textual analysis represents a key innovation of my data construction:
I fit a Bayesian topic model from the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) family on the output
disclosure collection from the previous step. The topic model is designed to infer the type,
or nature, of each disclosed event. This paper is the first in finance to employ the LDA
model to classify the nature of firm-level shocks from disclosures.3 In this subsection, I
briefly review the reasoning for the model, while deferring the exact model specification
and computation steps to Appendix A.1.2 for interested readers.
In short, the LDA model assumes a simple, two-distribution data generating process where
each disclosure is generated from a (latent) distribution over a collection of topics (i.e. shock
types), each of which is, in turn, a distribution over the words in the English vocabulary.
For example, a document that discusses the impact of a plant fire of its supplier should
be represented by a topic distribution that places high weight on a topic that places high
weight on words such as fire and flame. By contrast, a topic that places high weight on
earthquake and flood should receive a low weight in this distribution.
However, the two distributions are unobservable from the point of the researcher. The
advantage of probabilistic topic models is that, using Bayesian techniques, such models
efficiently infer the hidden distributional properties from the observable data (i.e. the col-
lection of documents). LDA represents one particular parameterization of the model: I first
assume that these two latent distributions belong to the Dirichlet family. Then, armed with
this functional form and the observed words in each disclosure, I compute the posterior (i.e.
empirical) topic and word distributions using the standard Bayes Theorem. These empirical
distributions are the main outputs of the model. The only inputs in LDA are the document
texts and the number of topics. As such, compared to a manual classification approach,
researcher-induced subjectivity and bias are minimized, and a much larger number of dis-
closures can be classified within a short period of time. Intuitively, the model would achieve
3For a list of LDA applications and an evaluation of their effectiveness, see Blei et al. (2003).
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a satisfactory performance if the top words representing each topic are distinct from each
other.
I fit the LDA algorithm with 20 topics on the collection of 19,771 disclosures.4 The first
outputs are the word distributions that identify the topics, and the top 5 keywords for each
topic are reported in Table 1.2 from Appendix A.1.2. Here the top words are very distinct
while intuitively and clearly identifying each topic. From these top keywords alone, an
average human reader would not have any confusion about the nature of each topic.5 The
second output is the topic mixture for each disclosure, i.e. the proportion of each disclosure
devoted to each topic. I keep the disclosure only if it exhibits more than 95% of a single
topic. This results in a collection of 12,337 documents, each classified into one of the 20
topics.
Identifying Idiosyncratic Shocks
From the 20 types, I then isolate the firm-specific, idiosyncratic ones. First however, note
that the meaning of “idiosyncratic shocks” differs in different research contexts in finance.
In my setting of shock spillovers, the following definition applies:
Definition 1 A shock is firm-specific and idiosyncratic if it is 1) not caused by exposure to
common, systematic factors, and 2) its immediate effect is clearly limited to the origin firm
only.
In other words, a firm-specific shock is clearly identified from a disclosure if the disclosed
event does not have systematic causes (i.e. caused by macroeconomic fluctuations), nor
does it have systematic effects of its own (i.e. its initial impact hits only the origin firm).
Both statements serve as exclusion conditions to insure the validity of the central identifying
4The main algorithm and the Gibbs sampling programs are implemented in the C++ programming
language. The classification remains robust from as few as 15 topics to as many as 45 topics, after which
overlapping redundancies appear. See Appendix A.1.2 for details. For research purposes, interested readers
can also contact the author for programs used in the analyses.
5Jegadeesh and Wu (2015) ask a team of human readers to manually classify a list of FOMC meeting
minutes. They agree with the LDA model for the vast majority of cases.
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assumption of this paper: any effect that a shock might cause to other firms is attributable
to the spillover effect through inter-firm linkages, and not due to original effect of the shock
itself. The first condition (idiosyncratic cause) is easier to verify, and I discuss that below.
The second, more nuanced condition (idiosyncratic effect) requires more extensive tests and
is thus devoted its own Section 1.4.1.
I first focus on the causes of these shocks. Because the LDA provides an intuitive classifica-
tion of shock types, the first condition, that the shocks are not caused by systematic factors,
can be validated by examining the nature of these types. Specifically, the 20 types can be
grouped into three levels of “idiosyncrasy”: First, 6 types of events are related to macroe-
conomic conditions and industry-wide factors, e.g. parts shortages caused by unexpectedly
high demand from other firms or consumers. Second, 6 types are related to events with
more granular causes, but it might still be possible to relate these types to industry-wide
issues. For example, events related to labor strikes might well be caused by firm-specific
factors, but one still cannot completely rule out the influence of industry-wide labor unions
that can possibly coordinate these strikes with both origin firms and their connected cus-
tomers. Finally, the last level contains 8 shock types, each one of which can be attributed
to idiosyncratic causes with little ambiguity. Such events include various natural disasters,
manmade disasters such as fire or crime, production glitches such as power outages and
unexpected machinery breakdowns, and technology adoption failures such as IT glitches
and attacks, etc. I include several concrete textual examples for each category in Appendix
A.1.3.
Because events in the last group are clearly not caused by systematic factors, they are the
best candidates for well-identified firm-specific shocks. I therefore keep only these events
in my sample and group these 8 types into five major groups.6 The resulting sample
is summarized in Table 1.1 below. Overall, I identify 11,191 idiosyncratic shock events,
covering 2,193 unique firms or 20.06% of the sample firms. At the firm level, they are
6In untabulated results, I also include the second group e.g. labor strikes. The results are slightly stronger
both economically and statistically.
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clearly of very low frequency, with each firm on average having 5 shocks.
[Insert Table 1.1 and Figure 1.2 here]
Figure 1.2 plots the total number of these idiosyncratic shocks over time, and the distribu-
tion by major types. Except for the first three years in the sample, the number of shocks
does not exhibit any particular trend or correlation with systematic factors such as busi-
ness cycles, further confirming that the shocks are indeed caused by idiosyncratic issues. A
potential concern is that the number of natural disaster-related shocks seems to increase
during the years of 2005 and 2011, the years when hurricane Katrina and the Japan earth-
quake took place. I address this and other concerns related to the shocks’ effects in Section
1.4.1.
1.2.2. Firm-Level Supply Chain Network
In order to empirically examine the spillover effect of the firm-specific shocks described
in the previous subsection, I construct a comprehensive, firm-level network of supplier-
customer relations between publicly traded firms globally, with historical coverage beginning
at 1994. Each shock in the previous dataset can then be mapped precisely to this network.
Specifically, for each year t, I capture the list of all supply relations between each supplier
j and customer i, inferred from the following sources:
1. The same collection of firm disclosures described in the previous subsection. In ad-
dition to operations-related disclosures, the SEC also requires firms to disclose the
formation and termination of important business relationships, a large portion of
which are supply chain relations. I use a robust name-matching algorithm to extract
the identities of both parties and record formation and termination dates from the col-
lection of 8-K filings, press releases, and firm-specific news. This procedure produces
414,355 supply relations among firms.
2. The Supply Chain Analytics databases from Bloomberg and Revere Data Systems,
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both of which conduct public and proprietary research that identifies supply chain
relationships between publicly traded firms globally. I extract these data with propri-
etary APIs provided by these sources and identify 1,190,474 relations.
3. Shipment-level data from US Customs Bill of Lading and a leading business casu-
alty insurance company. Both datasets provide a comprehensive account of all im-
port/export goods that clear the US Customs at the ports of departure/arrival. De-
tailed identities of both supplier(shipper) and customer(consignee) are also recorded.
I extract these information using a similar name-matching algorithm that results in
652,932 relations.
The resulting dataset contains 2,257,761 relations covering 23,059 publicly traded firms. I
use the following criteria to construct my final sample of firms:
• My dataset identifies firms using the International Securities Identification Number
(ISIN). I match the ISIN with GVKEY from the Compustat Global database to
retrieve accounting data. I exclude all firms for which I am either 1) not able to
match ISIN to GVKEY’s or 2) otherwise not able to obtain accounting data from
Bloomberg.
• At minimum, my tests also use market capitalization and return on total assets as
control variables. I exclude all firms for which these data are unavailable.
• The production process for financial and other services are likely to be different from
that of other goods. I exclude all financial and personal services firms (SIC code
6000-7999) from the sample.
Overall, the final sample captures 10,930 unique firms and 1,007,998 relationships from 1994
to 2015. Table 1.3 provides summary statistics of sample firms and supply relationships
captured by this sample. The mean market value is $2.045 billion and the book-to-market
ratio has a mean value of 0.715. The network data identifies over 90 links per firm over the
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1994-2015 period, and each link on average persists for 7 years. In addition, Panel C of Table
1.3 reports the average statistics for firms located on the path of the shocks (i.e. connected
at a distance of n = 1, . . . , 4 from the firms where the shocks originate). On average, firms
located further downstream (higher number of connections) from the shocks are slightly
smaller and younger in age. Except for that, firms located at different network positions
are similar in most other aspects such as book-to-market ratio, P/E ratio, leverage, etc.
[Insert Table 1.3 here]
For a smaller set of relationships (473,759), I am also able to capture the value of the rela-
tionship as a fraction of the customers’ cost of goods sold (COGS).The summary statistics
for these firms are very similar to the overall sample and are reported in Table 1.3 above.
For this sample, the average total COGS explained by the supply shares is 34.04%. I use
this smaller sample in a series of robustness tests, discussed in Section 1.4.
1.2.3. Other Relevant Data
All quarterly accounting data are from Compustat Global and Bloomberg. I obtain daily
stock return data primarily from CRSP and compute the same for international firms using
daily closing prices from Compustat, manually adjusted for stock splits and dividends. I
use these data to construct firm-level outcome and control variables, which are discussed
as they appear in subsequent texts. For interested readers, I also summarize the list of
variables used in this paper and their construction methodology in Appendix A.1.1.
1.3. Spillover of Firm-Specific Idiosyncratic Shocks in Network
This section provides empirical evidence on the substantial spillover of firm-specific shocks
along the firm-to-firm interconnections in the supply chain network, and the effect of such
spillover on the revenue and cash flows of firms that are 1) initially hit by the shocks, 2)
closely connected to the shocks’ origins, and 3) remotely connected to the origin beyond
the first-tier connections.
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1.3.1. Hypothesis Development
Conceptually, the shocks captured by my disclosure data represent firm-specific innovations
in their respective productivity processes. First, in models without networks, such shocks
do not impact any firm beyond the origin. Second, in most theoretical models with produc-
tion networks, such innovations are interlinked by the network connections (represented by
the network’s adjacency matrix). In the aggregate, these interlinkages introduce additional
covariances among firms’ outputs, thus changing aggregate output and consumption volatil-
ities. However, it is easy to derive that along each chain of links, e.g. S→C1→C2→ . . . ,
the effect of a shock quickly decays after each link.7 This scenario, which serves as the null
hypothesis, is that a shock to S would not significantly affect C1 and other firms beyond it.
So far, there is no empirical evidence on how far these shocks travel after C1 and whether
they do quickly dissipate. However, a large amount of disclosures from my text sample
do suggest that the effect of these shocks might persist beyond C2-type firms and even
significantly affect more remotely connected firms. Figure 1.3 plots the exact timeline
of such an example. Here, the factory of a hard drive component supplier (S:Nidec) was
damaged during a flood in 2011, causing production disruption and leading to lower revenue
growth. Its immediately connected customer (C1:Seagate) disclosed this disruption almost
immediately, and verified that its own production facilities were not affected. However,
due to input shortages, its output was also lower, while at the same time, due to its large
market share in the hard drive industry, it was able to charge a higher price for these
outputs, partially offsetting the quantity drop and leading to a more moderate decline in
revenue growth.
Surprisingly, C2 firms on the supply chain, Dell and HP, both experienced larger revenue
7To see this, consider the Cobb-Douglas production setting in Acemoglu et al. (2015) with output Yi,
labor input Li and intermediate good inputs Xji: Yi = AiL
1−α
i
(∏N
j=1X
γji
ji
)α
. Without an asymmetric
network (e.g. if we only have a single chain), if α < 1, i.e. labor has a non-zero share in total factor inputs,
then at each subsequent connection k, the impact of a shock to firm j would decrease by a factor of αγkj
as it travels downstream along the chain. With average α = 0.60 and γkj = 0.30, the effect of the shock is
82% lower after each link.
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declines, and both attributed them to supply chain disruptions caused by the flood. Partic-
ularly, they mention “significant and immediate” increases in supplier prices, coupled with
their inability to pass this increase to customers (due to the more competitive nature of the
computer manufacturing business compared to hard drive manufacturers), as the reason for
these lowered revenue and earnings numbers.
This example suggests that, contrary to predictions by existing theories, which assume
smooth production functions and competitive firms, significant spillover of firm-specific
shocks to remote connections can occur if firms along the chains are not perfectly competitive
and differ in characteristics such as market power. Consider a supply chain consisting of
three firms, S→C1→C2, where S experiences a shock causing lower outputs to both itself
and C1. Existing network models predict that the shock would not significantly effect
C2 if C1 is perfectly competitive. However, suppose both C1 and C2 have monopolistic
competitive powers. In this case, because C2’s input is now more scarce, C1 would raise
its price above the competitive level in order to recoup some losses and pass some effect to
C2. This behavior is extensively discussed in firm disclosures and illustrated in Figure 1.3.
If C1 has a high market power, it would be able to raise prices significantly (Seagate, the
C1 firm in the previous example, raised prices by 20% shortly after the flood). If C2 has a
low market power, it cannot raise prices as effectively while simultaneously facing a high-
powered supplier. In this case, C2’s output will be even further below the competitive level
predicted by existing models, thereby further extending the spillover effect of the original
shock.
In essence, at a granular level, significant deviations from perfect competition could lead
to significant shock spillover effects beyond the prediction of existing models that assume
perfect competition at all positions. In addition, Section 1.3.3 empirically examines two
auxiliary factors that might also contribute to shock spillovers: input substitutability and
inventories. Given the above framework, I test the following alternative hypothesis against
the theory-predicted null of no spillovers:
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Hypothesis 1 Given additional frictions such market power, input substitutability and in-
ventory, firm-specific idiosyncratic shocks could spill over significantly beyond both the ori-
gin and its closest connections, and significantly impact the economic outcome of a larger
number of distant connections.
I test the this hypothesis first using the following regression, which measures average out-
comes across all shocks:
Yit,t+k = a+
10∑
n=0
bnD
n
i,t + cXi,t + Fi,t + εi,t, (1.1)
where Dni,t is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if one of firm i’s suppliers from a distance
of n connections (up to 10) experiences an idiosyncratic shock in quarter t. Yit,t+k is the
k-quarter growth rate in revenue, operating cash flow, or change in gross margins. Xi,t−1
is a vector of lagged controls including market capitalization (Size), book-to-market ratio
(BM), P/E ratio (PE), leverage ratio (Lev), return on assets (ROA), and inventory (INV ),
all defined in Appendix A.1.1. Fi,t is the set of fixed effects including: industry×year, fiscal
quarter, and state/country fixed effects. The coefficients of interest is bn, which measures the
average difference in revenue and other growth rates between firms hit with a shock spilled
over from a distance of n connections, and firms never hit with any shocks. Hypothesis 1
predicts that the estimates for bn will be significantly negative, not only for n > 0, but also
for many of n > 1 as well.
1.3.2. Spillover Results
I first fit Regression (1.1) using 4-quarter revenue and operating cash flow growth rates,8
as well as changes in gross margin, and report the coefficient estimates for n = 0, . . . , 4 in
Table 1.4. The coefficient b0 measures the effect of the shock on the originating firm itself,
and none of the coefficients bn are statistically significant at the 10% level when n ≥ 5.
8I also use revenue growth rates from t to t+ 1, t+ 2, and t+ 3 quarters. For most distances, the impact
is concentrated around the first quarter i.e (t, t+ 1).
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[Insert Table 1.4 here]
The first column of this table reports the impact of the shocks on originating firms them-
selves. The coefficient estimate for b0 is -0.0258, compared to a sample mean revenue growth
rate of 0.1061 with a standard deviation of 0.2885. Therefore, on average, the shocks cap-
tured by my disclosure data indeed have significant impact on the firms that are directly hit
by them, causing revenue growth to be about 24.3% lower than average or 8.9% standard
deviation lower.
The next four columns document the significant spillover of shocks to as far as 4 connections
away from origin. Starting from the closest connection (n=1), these firm-specific shocks
cause substantial impacts to the revenue growth of customer firms in the next 4 tiers of
connections. Following the shock, revenue growth for the closest customers is about 21.6%
below the mean. This is smaller in magnitude, but similar in statistical significance, to
Barrot and Sauvagnat (2014), who, using hurricane and Compustat segments data, find
that the largest customers (> 10% revenue) of firms whose headquarters are located in the
disaster area subsequently experience revenue growth up to 35% lower.
Surprisingly, the effect of my firm-specific shocks continues to spill over to the customers of
these customers (n=2), and their customers (n=3), and again to their customers (n=4). The
average effect ranges between 11.7% to 35.5% lower than the mean. While the difference
between these coefficients are not statistically significant at the 10% level, the coefficients
themselves are all significantly negative, with t-statistics below -3.00. This provides strong
evidence of the existence of frictions e.g. market power, that are not present in existing
theoretical models. This results in the significant spillover of firm-specific, idiosyncratic
shocks, not only beyond the origins of these shocks, but also beyond their closest connections
as well. Section 1.3.3 tests these factors in detail at the firm level.
In addition, Panels B and C of this table report similar estimates using the 4-quarter growth
rate of operating cash flows (Compustat variable OIBDPQ) and change in gross margin
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(SALEQ-COGSQ/SALEQ) on the left hand side. The estimates are consistent with the
revenue results. In particular, gross margin declines are particularly acute for firms more
remote from the origins, potentially indicating that they have lower market power than
their suppliers, thus are not as free to adjust prices and consequently are hit with both
quantity and price impacts, thereby further contributing to the spillover of shocks.
Finally, note that the previous results are reported as average percentage impacts across
all types of shocks. Because different shocks likely have different impact magnitudes, some
additional results are in order to provide further clarity on the magnitudes of coefficient
estimates. In particular, for each tier of connections (i.e. where Dni,t = 1), I first replace the
dummy with the shock’s impact on the origin in Regression (1.1), resulting in the following
specification:
Yit,t+4 = a+
10∑
n=0
bnY
n
0,it + cXi,t + Fi,t + εi,t (1.2)
where Y n0,it is the 4-quarter revenue growth rate of the firm from which the distance-n shock
impacting firm i originates. In this setting, the coefficient estimates can be interpreted as
“elasticities”: bn measure the impact of the spillover on subsequent connections n = 1, . . . , 4
in units of the percentage impact on the origin firm. The results are reported in Table 1.5.
[Insert Table 1.5 here]
The results in this table suggest that the spillover effect is not driven only by shocks of large
impact. Even after controlling for the impact of the shock on origin firms, the coefficient
estimates are still close to 1 at the first three connections and remain statistically significant
at distance 4, indicating that shocks that cause a one-unit impact at the origin firm continue
to spillover downstream and cause impacts between 40% to 100% of the original impact even
to remote, 4th-tier firms.
In summary, these results provide strong evidence that when firms are interconnected in
the network of supply chains, shocks previously thought as purely localized are not limited
within traditional firm boundaries. Instead, they can transmit along the supply linkages
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and cause widespread impacts at points remote from origin. I discuss the responses from
corporate policies and stock prices in Section 1.5.
1.3.3. Determinants of Spillover Magnitude
Having documented the surprisingly large and far-reaching spillover results, this subsection
examines in detail the economic story behind these spillovers. Because existing theories
predict that shocks quickly die down after each connection, there must be additional frictions
present in the data that give rise to such spillovers. One of them is the departure from perfect
competitiveness, which has been discussed in Section 1.3.1 above: if firms located further
downstream on average have lower market power than their suppliers, then the revenue
impact of the shock could be bigger than predictions made with the assumption of perfect
competitiveness. This section empirically examines the existence of these frictions from the
data. I first conduct a firm-level test on whether market power is significantly related to
the impact of transmitted shock on each individual firm. I then conduct a network-level
test: I examine the average market power at each position of the network, i.e. at each
distance from the shocks’ origins. In addition, conditional on the occurrence of spillover,
input substitutability and inventory levels can further modify its magnitude. I conduct
similar firm-level tests for these auxiliary frictions.
Main Channel: Market Power Along the Supply Chain
As discussed in Section 1.3.1 and corroborated by the anecdotal evidence in Figure 1.3,
with monopolistic competition, firms’ ability to change prices following the spilled over shock
beyond perfectly competitive levels can give rise to significant revenue impacts beyond levels
predicted by models with perfect competition. At the firm level, this ability is captured
by the monopolistic market power of the firm. The spillover effect is particularly acute for
competitive firms with less competitive suppliers, which limits their ability to change prices
and pass some of the shocks’ effects to customers (or final consumers), while enabling their
suppliers to pass a larger portion of the impact to them via price increases. I summarize
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this channel in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 Given a shock spilled over from a supplier, the revenue growth rates of firms
with lower monopolistic power than their suppliers will be more severely impacted.
I directly compute the absolute market power of each firm as its size relative to the total size
of its most granular industry classification (at the 4-digit SIC level):9 MPi,t =
Sizei,t−1∑Ni
k Sizek,t−1
.
I also compute its relative market power to its suppliers as the ratio of its own MP to the
average MP of its connected suppliers: MPRi,t =
MPi,t
E
ji
[MPj,t]
.
I then test Hypothesis 2 at the firm level using the following regression with MP and MPR
measures as interaction variables:
Yit,t+s = a+
4∑
n=0
bnD
n
i,t ·MPi,t +
4∑
n=0
cnD
n
i,t + dMPi,t + τXi,t−1 + Fi,t + εi,t, (1.3)
where Dn are the same shock dummies. To facilitate interpretation, I demean the values
of MP and MPR and scale them by the sample standard deviations. The coefficients of
interest are bn and cn. Here cn measures the average spillover impact given average values of
market power. bn assesses the validity of Hypothesis 2: it measures the incremental effect of
one-standard-deviation change in market power (or market power ratio) on revenue growth
rate differences between firms with distance-n shocks and firms without shocks.
[Insert Table 1.6 here]
Table 1.6 reports the results. First, the cn estimates are still significantly negative, albeit
smaller in magnitude, in both panels. Therefore, at average levels of market power, shocks
can still cause impacts to close and remote firms. Second, the estimates for the interaction
term, D ×MP , are significantly positive. For example, a one-standard-deviation decrease
in the market power of a firm closely connected to the shock origin (n=1) would further
decrease the revenue growth by another 25% below average. This is consistent with Hy-
9The results are not changed when MP is computed at the 3-digit SIC level and are moderately weaker
when computed at the 2-digit SIC level.
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pothesis 2 that market power is indeed significantly related to shock spillover at the firm
level. Moreover, the estimates for relative market power, reported as D ×MPR in Panel
B, are all significantly negative, indicating that firms with lower market power than their
suppliers are indeed most exposed to the effect of shock spillovers.
Next I perform the network-level test. Recall that the average spillover effect is significantly
negative up to 4 connections away from origin. If this effect arises because of market power,
then market power should on average decline as shocks travel downstream from the origin
toward final consumers. In other words, on average firms located “more downstream,” or
close to final consumers, should be more competitive than “upstream firms” located more
closely to raw materials. Because the notion of network positions is a relative one, the precise
classification of “upstream” versus “downstream” is difficult without individual-good-level
data. However, because my data captures the exact origins of each shock, I can proxy the
firms’ network positions with their distances from the shocks’ origins: firms located further
away from the shock should on average be more “downstream” and located closer to final
consumers.10 I can therefore conduct a network-level test of the market power channel
by comparing the average market power of firms located at each distance from the shock
origins.
Starting from the origin of the shock i, I compute the average market power for each distance
of connections:
MPn = E
j
[MPj |j on path of i shock &Dist(j, i) = n] , n = 1, . . . , 10. (1.4)
Even though MPn is a relatively crude proxy, if it uniformly declines as n increases, this
would provide consistent evidence on the network level that market powers can indeed
facilitate shocks spillovers to remote firms. Table 1.7 reports the MPn levels.
10In the example from Figure 1.3, distance-2 firms, Dell and HP, indeed disclose that they produce IT
products primarily for the consumer market, while the distance-1 firm, Seagate, primarily sells its hard
drives to distance-2 firms rather than directly to consumers.
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[Insert Table 1.7 here]
This table provide confirmatory evidence that, on average, firms located further down the
supply chain from shock origins have lower market power. Because the shocks are distributed
across many positions in the network, this measure is relative in nature: origin and distance-
1 firms tend to be located more “upstream” in the supply chains and are closer to raw
materials, and on average, their market power is significantly higher than distance-3 or
-4 firms, which are located closer to the final consumers. The standard deviations are
high for all distances, as such, the results cannot statistically establish this pattern for all
links. However, they are consistent with the intuition that the more remote, “downstream”
firms producing more consumer-oriented goods are on average more competitive than firms
producing business-oriented, intermediate goods. Therefore, through the market power
channel, spillover to these more remote firms is possible.
Auxiliary Channels: Input Substitutability and Inventories Along the Supply
Chain
This subsection links the degree of shock spillover to the degree of substitutability between
inputs, which measures the ease of alternative sourcing, and inventories, which serve as a
strategic buffer against production interruptions. Consider the same two-tier supply chain
(S→C1→C2) mentioned before: first, if individual inputs are perfectly substitutable, then
as long as there is more than one supplier at each link, a shock from S would never be able to
transmit beyond S, because both C1 and C2 would costlessly switch to alternative sources.
At the opposite, suppose that the inputs are perfect complements (i.e. the production
functions are Leontief). Here alternative sourcing is impossible, and the shocks would
“perfectly” transmit along the chain, with infinite marginal impact to both C1 and C2.
Real-world production probably falls somewhere between the two extremes, while Boehm
et al. (2014) find evidence that the relation is close to Leontief between imported and
domestic inputs. Therefore, while not enough to generate spillover on their own, variations
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in input substitutability can further modify the magnitude of spillovers, conditional on their
occurrence: if the first-tier (S→C1) connection has higher substitutability than higher-tier
(C1→C2) connections, the effect on C2 could be bigger than predictions made using, say,
Cobb-Douglas production functions.
Similarly, when hit with a supply shock, firms with more input inventories already have
more redundant inputs at hand, so they are less subject to the impact of the shock. Firms
with infinite inventories, similar to those with perfectly substitutable inputs, are never
subject to any spilled over shocks. Firms with zero inventories are the most sensitive to
the impact of any shock. Inventories are costly to hold, so most real-world firms hold some
minimum “safety level” computed using common operations models. If the average level of
inventories differ at different distances from the origin of supply shocks, then ceteris paribus,
this would result in different levels of shock impact on average. I summarize these channels
in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 Given a shock spilled over from a supplier, the revenue growth rates of firms
whose suppliers are less substitutable, and firms with lower inventory levels, will be more
severely impacted.
A firm-level proxy for input substitutability is needed for the empirical tests. For a smaller
sample of firms, my data capture exact value of the supply relationships as a fraction of
the customer’s inputs, i.e. γji,t =
Vji,t
COGSi,t
. If supplier j constitutes an important part of
customer i’s production, as indicated by a high γji, then j is likely harder for i to substitute.
In this setting, the γjis measures the “switching cost” of finding alternative suppliers in the
event of a disruptive supply shock. As such, they directly proxy for the substitutability
of each supplier. For each customer i, I compute its average supplier substitutability as
γi,t = E
ji
[γji,t]. To ensure robustness, I use several industry-based alternative measures
of substitutability and report their results in Appendix A.1.4. Firm-level inventories are
defined as the ratio of total inventory to total assets: INV Ri,t =
INV Ti,t−1
ATi,t−1
.
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I then test Hypothesis 3 with the following regressions:
Yit,t+4 = a+
4∑
n=0
bnD
n
i,t · γi,t +
4∑
n=0
cnD
n
i,t + dγi,t + τXi,t−1 + Fi,t + εi,t, (1.5a)
Yit,t+4 = a+
4∑
n=0
bnD
n
i,t · INV Li,t +
4∑
n=0
cnD
n
i,t + dINV Li,t + τXi,t−1 + Fi,t + εi,t. (1.5b)
where I demean the values of γ and INV L and scale them by the sample standard devia-
tions. The interpretation of these regressions is the same as Regression (1.3): bn assesses the
incremental effect of one-standard-deviation change in supplier substitutability (or inven-
tories) on revenue growth rate differences between firms with distance-n shocks and firms
without them. The coefficient estimates are reported in Table 1.8.
[Insert Table 1.8 Here]
The roles of inventories and supplier substitutability are evident from this table. The
estimates for both D× INV R and D× γ are significantly positive and economically large.
They can be interpreted as follows: when a firm experiences a shock, possibly from a remote
source along its supply chain, if its inventory level, or supplier’s substitutability, is one
standard deviation higher/lower, then the spillover effect would be mitigated/exacerbated
by 11% and 37% of the average revenue growth rates, respectively. Therefore, conditional
on a shock occurring from somewhere in the supply chain, both inventories and supplier
substitutability can indeed further affect its impact on the firm.
A word of caution is that, when put in the same regression, only MP (or MPR) remains
statistically significant. This is because market power leads to impacts on both prices and
quantities, while inventories and substitutability likely affect quantities only. Therefore,
these two channels are likely auxiliary to the market power channel.
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1.4. Key Robustness Tests
The surprisingly pronounced spillover effects documented in the previous two sections de-
mand careful checks and examinations in order to firmly establish their internal and external
validity. The unique, granular nature of the data facilitates a series of direct robustness
tests. In this section I discuss several tests that are most helpful in solidifying the paper’s
results. A host of additional robustness checks can be found in Appendix A.1.4.
1.4.1. Are the Shocks Well-Identified?
Recall that the shocks captured by my data have to meet two hurdles to be considered well-
identified idiosyncratic shocks: they have to have both idiosyncratic causes and localized,
firm-specific effects. The construction and summary statistics presented in Section 1.2.1
have provided evidence on the first condition. This subsection specifically discusses tests
needed to confirm the second condition.
Some Large Shocks Might Have Systematic Effects
The first concern is perhaps the most salient: some shocks, such as large natural disasters,
although idiosyncratic in nature, might have wide-ranging impacts on not only the origin
firms that report these shocks, but also their connected customers, either directly (i.e. the
disaster hits both the disclosing firm and their customers) or indirectly (i.e. the disaster
creates a region-wide demand shock that feeds back to the revenue of both origin firms and
their customers). In both cases, the shock’s spillover effect through linkages is contami-
nated by the “systematic effect” of the shocks and the coefficient estimates in my empirical
framework would be amplified. Therefore, if on average my sample is populated by these
large shocks, then the empirical results cannot be ascribed solely to shock spillover through
supply chain linkages.
Fortunately, because LDA classifies shocks into distinct categories, I can perform three
tests to rule out this case. First, I replicate the spillover results from Regression (1.1)
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while deleting from the sample one shock type at a time. I then redo the tests using only
one category at a time. Finally, I keep only one category of shocks that are unequivocally
idiosyncratic in both cause and effect: fires, which are extracted from the manmade disaster
category of my sample by a simple keyword search for fire-related words. This results in a
collection of 174 shocks, and I redo the spillover analysis using only this reduced sample.
The results for these tests are reported in Panels A to C of Table 1.9.
[Insert Table 1.9 here]
In all three cases the results are not significantly changed, which confirms that on average,
my sample is not contaminated by shocks with potentially systematic effects. Their initial
impacts are localized to the origin firm only, thus their subsequent impact on connected
customers are indeed due to the spillover induced by the supply chain linkages.
Prior Growth Trends
Next, for the disclosure-based shocks to be well-identified idiosyncratic shocks, before their
onset, a firm’s revenue growth should be similar to those that are never hit with any
shocks. This implies that there must not be a statistically significant difference in prior-
period growth rates between these two groups. To test this prior trends assumption, I
fit Regression (1.1), replacing the left hand variable with lagged one quarter (t − 1, t) to
8 quarters (t − 8, t) revenue growth rates, for both the origin firms (n = 0) and their
subsequent connections (n = 1, . . . 4). I tabulate these results in Table 1.10.
[Insert Table 1.10 here]
This table clearly demonstrates that none of the estimates for (t − 1, t) to (t − 8, t) are
statistically significant. This indicates no significant difference in prior-to-shock revenue
growth rates between treated (hit with shock) and control firms in the previous two years.
As such, the significant difference in growth rates shown in Table 1.4 are likely due to the
spillover effect through supply chain linkages rather than any existing trends in the data.
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Strategic Disclosure of Shocks by Firms
A key feature of my shock data is that they are extracted from voluntary firm disclosures,
such as 8-Ks and press releases. Therefore, one might worry whether firms are completely
truthful in their disclosures, or if there are systematic differences in the reporting standards
of these events.
This concern is legitimate and important, because strategic disclosure of these events can
introduce amplifying biases to the estimates from the spillover regressions, for three rea-
sons: First, firms might disclose a shock only if its impact is too large to strategically
hide from public view. In this case, the shocks that I capture would be overrepresented
by large idiosyncratic shocks, thereby artificially inflating the true spillover effect from the
interconnections.
A closely related concern is reverse causality: A manager facing low future revenue growth
rates might attempt to “explain away” this bad performance by pointing to “idiosyncratic
shocks to the supply chain” that are out of their control. Zhou (2014) documents the usage
of such “external blame” language in earnings conference call transcripts. If such strategic
blame is prevalent in the shock disclosures, then the true spillover effects measured in
Regression (1.1) could also be contaminated upwards.
I first address the concern of unbalanced reporting of only large shocks, via an exogenous
change in the disclosure reporting standards. In particular, an extension to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX Act) mandates additional “real time” disclosures of information on material
changes in firms’ operations, which include supply chain-related activities, beyond the orig-
inal SOX Act requirements. The SEC began to strictly enforce the provision on August
23, 2004.11 This enforcement thus serves as an exogenous policy shock after which firms
would presumably disclose more supply disruptions, which is confirmed by Schmidt and
Raman (2013). I therefore cut the sample into two halves corresponding to before and after
11https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8400.htm
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this enforcement date, and replicate Regression (1.1) on each subsample. If unbalanced
reporting is a problem, then the results would be weaker in the post-2004 subsample. Panel
A of Table 1.12 presents the results. Results before and after 2004 are very similar in both
economic magnitudes and statistical significance, indicating that firms are not intentionally
disclosing only major shocks.12
[Insert Table 1.12 here]
Next, the reverse causality concern is addressed with subsample analysis. Recall that my
sample shocks are extracted from two types of disclosures: 71.03% are shocks to the disclos-
ing firm itself and 28.97% are disclosed shocks from external suppliers. Because strategic
blaming of external suppliers is not an issue for the former sample, I replicate Regression
(1.1) using only this restricted sample of shocks and report the coefficients in Panel B of
Table 1.12. Here again, the coefficients are not significantly different between the restricted
and unrestricted samples, suggesting that reserve causality related to the strategic blaming
of external parties in disclosures is not significantly present in my shock data.
Finally, recall Table 1.1 before: it also shows that the firms disclosing shocks are not sta-
tistically different in size, book-to-market ratios, and other dimensions, from those without
disclosures. This indicates that the disclosure decision of a shock is not related to any partic-
ular firm characteristics, alleviating potential concerns of some firms strategically reporting
these shocks more than others.
Overall, the tests in this subsection further confirm that my sample of LDA-classified firm
disclosures capture well-identified idiosyncratic shocks at the firm level. The versatility of
my methodology enables its use to identify shocks in more general contexts as well (e.g.
shocks outside supply chains such as financing shocks), as a robust identification tool for
empirical finance researchers.
12Inserting the post-enforcement period as a dummy variable produces similar results.
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1.4.2. Are Shocks Correctly Mapped to the Network?
Having established that the shock data are well-identified and idiosyncratic, one still needs
to make sure that these shocks are correctly mapped to the network, and that the spillover
results are indeed caused by these mapped shocks and not by 1) spurious statistical factors
and 2) the mathematical operation of taking averages on network links that are unevenly
distributed at different positions. The first concern is easily addressed through a falsification
test discussed below. I defer the technical details of the second test to Appendix A.1.4 for
interested readers.
Because my data record the date of occurrence for each shock, I conduct the following
falsification test to rule out spurious relations. Specifically, for each shock date t and firm
i, I first reset all D0i,t = 0. I then randomly assign falsified “shocks” to firms on each
occurrence date, i.e. ∃ D̂0i,t = 1 for some random i. I then trace out the customers of these
firms, recreate similar tiered dummies D̂ni,t. n = 1, . . . , 4, and repeat Regression (1.1). Table
1.11 reports the coefficient estimates.
[Insert Table 1.11 here]
This table demonstrates that, while using real data, the spillover effect is significantly
negative for the first 5 distances; none of the estimates are statistically significant using
randomly assigned shock data. Therefore one can be more confident that the spillover
impacts are indeed caused by the mapped shocks to the network linkages, and not by
spurious relations.
1.4.3. External Validity: Private Firms
A valid concern about the spillover results from the previous sections is their generaliz-
ability: crucially, my data contain only publicly-traded firms. This leads to two potential
concerns, first, would network data be general and complete enough even with the lack of
private firms? Second, would omitting private firms lead to amplifying biases on coefficient
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estimates? If both can be ruled out, then the spillover result, even though derived using
public-firm data, can be readily generalized to all firms.
Recall that a subset of my network data contains valued relationships. This enables me
to empirically examine the first concern. The intuition is as follows: first, the make-use
table between sectors (defined by NAICS codes) constructed by the BEA contains data
from both public and private firms with more than 50 employees. Second, if I aggregate
the relationship values flowing from all firms in one sector to all firms in another, I can
reproduce a similar table and compare the sectoral-level input shares V/COGS with the
shares in the BEA table. Therefore, if the shares are comparable, then adding or removing
private firms probably would not fundamentally change the shape of the overall network.
I aggregate the smaller sample of 7,054 domestic firms with valued supplier relationship
data into 41 industry groups according to BEA’s definition.13 I then compute the within-
and between-group trade shares by summing up the values at the end of 2013 for all firms
within and between each group, then scale by the sum of COGS. This results in 1,681
sectoral shares, which I then correlate with the same shares computed from the 2013 use
table from the BEA.14 Appendix A.1.2 details the construction steps. The Spearman’s rank
correlation between these shares is 0.815. This indicates that, at least on the sectoral level,
my public-firm data produce a network of similar shape to the combined data of both public
and private firms.
Second, because my shocks are all originated from publicly traded firms, to the extent that
private firms serve as alternative suppliers to other public firms along the shocks’ paths,
this would produce an attenuation bias to the estimates, making it more difficult to find
a significant result. One would also raise other concerns related to external validity, e.g.
the generalizability of results to positive shocks. I address these additional concerns in
13The actual BEA table has 71 industries. I remove industries that are not present in my dataset such as
financial services, resulting in 41 groups.
14Available at
http://www.bea.gov/industry/xls/io-annual/IOUse Before Redefinitions PRO 1997-2013 Summary.xlsx
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Appendix A.1.4.
1.5. Financial Response from Firm and Market to Spillovers
The results in the previous sections document a pronounced and robust spillover effect in
the network of supply chains: localized, firm-specific shocks can cause substantial impact to
the revenue of firms located up to 4 connections away. Given both the broad reach and the
large magnitude, one would intuitively expect significant responses, from both corporate
financial policies and firm valuations, to these significant spillovers.
However, existing theories and empirical research have not explored these responses. Specif-
ically, first, do firms even recognize this spillover and adjust anything in response? Second,
what policies would firms adjust? Third, how much would they adjust? Do they simply
make up shortfalls after these spillovers, or would they respond more pro-actively and ag-
gressively? Finally, is there any heterogeneity in the response to close vs. remote spillovers?
By examining firms’ post-shock discussions from their 10-K/Qs, this section first uncovers a
series of policies that the firms say they would adjust, then empirically tests whether firms
actually do adjust these policies and the intensity of such adjustments. I then examine the
adjustment in firm values by documenting the stock price response to these shocks, and
uncover heterogeneities in responses from shocks spilled over from close vs. remote sources.
1.5.1. Hypothesis Development
Because previous research has not provided empirical evidence or theoretical insights on
corporate responses to supply chain shocks, one needs to be careful in the analysis to avoid
data snooping bias. Fortunately, the same firms that disclose these shocks often discuss
their response to these shocks in subsequent disclosures such as 10-K/Qs. Therefore, from
these disclosures, I can directly extract the list of variables that are most often talked about.
I proceed with a simple three-step keyword search: First, similar to Jegadeesh and Wu
(2013), for each firm that discloses a shock, I obtain their 10-K/Qs filed in the next four
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quarters, and isolate the Management Discussion & Analysis (MD&A) section. Second,
from these discussions, I use the same keyword filters discussed in Section 1.2.1 to look for
sentences related to these shocks. Third, from each keyword within the sentences, I tabulate
the frequency of the words closest to the keyword and manually isolate the most frequent
occurrences related to corporate policies. This results in three groups of top keywords
related to:
1. Strategic buffers and reserves: cash, working capital, inventory, buffer, excess, etc
2. Production adjustments and alternative sourcing: redesign, accommodate, alternative
supplies, redundant sourcing, etc
3. Financing motives: strong balance sheet, funding source, etc
These words directly give a starting point for the empirical analysis. First, they relate
to buildups in working capital such as cash and inventories, possibly beyond the levels
before the shocks’ impact. Second, they relate to adjusting production or redesign some
aspects of products to accommodate a wider selection of alternative suppliers, which suggest
changes in capital expenditures and possibly R&D investments into these adjustment costs
and technologies. Third, firms seem to be concerned about how to finance these buildups,
indicating that they might tap into external funding sources such as debt or equity issuances.
I summarize these insights in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 Following a spilled over shock, firms enter an active buildup phase in their
working capital and longer-term investments, possibly beyond simple recovery levels. Such
activities require financing beyond internal funds.
I test this hypothesis using the following regressions:
CFit,t+k = a+ bnD
n
i,t + cXi,t−1 + dFi,t + εi,t, (n = 0, 1, 2, k = −1, . . . , 8), (1.6)
where Dn is the same shock dummy from previous specifications, except that I now group all
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firms beyond the closest connection into the “remote connections” group and set Dn=2 = 1
∀n ≥ 2. CF is the change in corporate investment and financing policies including:
• Working capital: (1) Cash, (2) Inventories
• Capital expenditures: (3) CAPEX, (4) R&D expense
• Financing “pecking order”: (5) Retained earnings, (6-7) net equity and debt issuances,
and (8) trade credits (account payables)
All CF variables are changes scaled by lagged total assets. The exact construction for each
variable can be found in Appendix A.1.1. Here the bn coefficient measures the incremental
change in corporate policies for firms hit with shocks compared to those that are not.
1.5.2. Proactive Cash and Capital Buildups
I first fit Regression (1.6) with the first four variables related to working capital and capital
expenditures on the left hand side. To rule out prior trends, I first use changes from the
(t− 1, t) period. I then use changes from (t, t+ 1), (t, t+ 4), and (t, t+ 8) quarters. Table
1.13 reports the results.
[Insert Table 1.13 here]
Three observations are immediate from this table. First, contemporaneously, the shocks
have negative impacts on the working capital of both origin firms and their customers: in
the second row of this table both inventories and cash holding changes are from 2.0% to 8.3%
standard deviation lower than comparable firms. In the quarters after the shock, however,
firms hit with shocks (either directly or through spillovers) in turn accumulate significantly
more cash and inventories than those not hit with shocks: rows 3 and 4 of the table indicate
that cash and inventory growth are 4.7% to 14.8% standard deviation higher. This result
strongly suggests a significant buildup in working capital after the shocks. Perhaps in a
similar mechanism as Dessaint and Matray (2015), firms hit with supply shocks become
more salient, causing managers to engage in more precautionary behaviors.
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Second, the buildup behavior is also evident in longer-term capital expenditures: CAPEX
growth ranges between 2.6% and 5.8% standard deviation higher during the next 8 quarters,
while R&D expense is mildly higher but not as statistically significant. This is consistent
with firms’ own disclosures that they pro-actively seek to accommodate alternative supply
sources after the shocks, by reconfiguring their production systems or redesigning some
aspects of their products. These efforts would, and indeed have, translated into higher
capital expenditures.
Third, interestingly, the buildup is much more muted for firms experiencing shocks spilled
over from more remote sources (distance n¿1). For these firms, only CAPEX is significantly
higher than comparable firms, and the buildup in working capital from closer connections
is absent. This suggests the existence of information acquisition frictions within the deeper
structures of supply chains: as the supply chains become longer, it would be exponen-
tially more costly for firms to accurately monitor and trace the source of shocks from the
more remote tiers of connections. As such, their response to remote shocks is more muted
and slower. Anecdotally, this “limited visibility” has been extensively discussed in firms’
disclosures, and the empirical results from this section can motivate a class of information-
theoretic models where the network structure of inter-firm relations can be explicitly ac-
counted for, and thus generate heterogeneous responses to shocks from different network
positions.
1.5.3. Changes in Capital Structure and Financial Leverage
The capital buildup documented in the previous subsection is substantial in magnitude.
Therefore, both the researcher, and indeed the firms themselves, would be concerned whether
the firms have enough internal resources to finance these endeavors, or need to tap into ex-
ternal sources of financing. I therefore use the last four variables in the list from Section
1.5.1 on the left hand side of Regression (1.6). These are related to the “pecking-order” of
financing, and the coefficient bn measures the incremental change of these financing policies
after the shock spillover, compared to firms not hit with any shocks.
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[Insert Table 1.14 here]
I report the results in Table 1.14 above. Similar to the previous table, three observations
are evident from Table 1.14: first, the buildup documented in the previous subsection does
not seem to be financed by internal funds. This is perhaps expected because the shocks
captured by the disclosure data are mostly negative, leading to lower operating cash flow
growth (from Table 1.4) and, ceteris paribus, lower retained earnings, which is confirmed in
this table as changes in retained earnings range between 2.4% to 6.5% standard deviation
lower. Similarly, because these shocks are shocks from suppliers, it is not surprising that
trade credits are also slightly lower.
This leaves external sources of funding such as debt or equity issuances. The last three
columns of the top panel show little change in equity issuances post-shock. However, debt
issuance is significantly higher for both origin firms and their close, and remote, connec-
tions, ranging from 1.4% to 4.7% standard deviation higher. This translates into market
leverage that is between 2.2% and 9.4% standard deviation higher. These results suggest
an interesting trade-off: firms are taking on higher debt levels to build up their working
capital reserves, which is itself a costly endeavor. As such, shock spillovers through the
supply chains lead to firms trading off higher default risk (as a consequence of becoming
more levered) with lower operating risk (mitigated effect of spillovers). This again leaves
room for future theory development in financing policies.
Third, similar to the previous table, the increase in debt issuance and leverage is also
more subdued for firms facing more remote shocks. This again suggests the existence of
information frictions that are severe and costly enough to prevent firms from engaging
in potentially costly increases in financial leverage without clear visibility into the exact
sources of spillovers.
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1.5.4. Changes in Firm Valuation
This subsection examines the effect of shock spillovers on firm value. I form my hypothesis
as follows: First assume that the market is not aware that shocks have hit the firm before
they are disclosed (my tests also check for pre-announcement leaks). Then, when a firm
discloses these shocks, an efficient market should immediately deduce the magnitude of
the effects, and discount the stock prices accordingly to reflect the updated firm valuation.
Because my shock sample consists of disclosures of both firms’ own shocks and shocks from
their tier-1 suppliers, I form the first equal-weighted stock portfolio consisting of all origin
firms and their immediate customers i.e. the S and C1 firms in the S→C1→C2→ . . . chain.
The effect on the remote connections, i.e. C2, C3...’s price, however, is uncertain. In the
extreme case, the market might not even know that C1 and C2 are linked. A more likely
scenario is that the market is aware of the linkage, but takes some time to fully ascertain
the effect as C2 is further away from the shock source. This can either be due to investor
inattention as suggested by Cohen and Frazzini (2008), or due to information processing
constraints that prevent investors from processing complex network structures in a timely
fashion. Therefore, the abnormal market return for remote connections, if any, might persist
for a longer period than that of the origins and their immediate connections. I summarize
this intuition in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5 Firms that experience a supply disruption should experience negative abnor-
mal returns around the event’s reporting date. If customers linked to the firm also experience
negative abnormal returns, then these returns should persist for a longer period after the
reporting date.
For a window of [-10, 40] trading days around the report date t, I define the report period
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cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and abnormal turnover (AT ) as follows:
CARi,t+s =
s∏
k=−10
Reti,k −
s∏
k=−10
Retvw,k,
ATi,s =
60V ols
100∑
k=40
V ols−k
− 1, s ∈ [−10, 40], (1.7)
where Reti,t and Retvw,t are gross returns on stock i and on the CRSP value-weighted index
on date t. V olt is the trading turnover on date t. CAR measures market-adjusted returns
while AT measures the extra trading volume as a fraction of the previous 60 trading days
from t−100 to t−40. Figure 1.4 plots the average CAR and AT for the three equal-weighted
portfolios consisting of (1: S+C1), (2: select C1), and (3: C2,C3...) firms, respectively.
[Insert Figure 1.4 here]
Three observations are evident from this figure. First, the reported events captured by my
dataset are not leaked in advance. Both abnormal returns and abnormal turnover prior to
the events’ disclosure dates are not significantly different from zero. The events therefore
are likely reported on a timely basis consistent with SEC-mandated disclosure standards,
and do not represent stale news either.
Second, the solid black line of this figure (left axis) plots the cumulative abnormal returns
(CAR) for the equal-weighted portfolio consisting of all origin firms and their tier-1 cus-
tomers. Here, consistent with the hypothesis, the market reacts promptly to supply shocks
on the origin firms and their immediate customers: For the three days [t,t+2] after the
event, the cumulative abnormal return is -3.98%. The return does not revert in the follow-
ing days, indicating that the market is indeed cognizant of the first-tier spillover effect of
the shock on real outcomes such as revenue.
Third, the dotted black line plots the CAR for the equal-weighted portfolio of all remote
connections of the origin firms beyond the tier-1 connections. The market does not seem to
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immediately price in these remote, spilled-over shocks, and the CAR declines more slowly,
and persistently drifts downwards for up to 40 trading days. This indicates that the market
is slower to realize the impact of shock spillovers from more remote sources. In addition,
the gray line plots the CAR for the equal-weighted portfolio of all tier-1 customers that
did not directly report any supplier shocks. That is, for these firms, the impact has to be
inferred from someone else’s disclosure, either the supplier’s or from another customer that
is also connected to the supplier. Here the market reaction is also slower than the case of
direct disclosures, consistent with the information processing constraint channel: inferring
these indirect network linkages takes time, and the market is thus slower in fully adjusting
the stock prices for firms located more remotely from the origins.
These results suggest the existence of possible profitable arbitrage opportunities for investors
who are more adept at analyzing the complex structure of supply chains, and also establishes
the linkage of the spillover effects to network-related systematic risks and expected stock
returns. I explore these asset pricing related issues in a related paper.
1.6. Concluding Remarks
This paper is the first in finance to empirically quantify how firms’ localized, idiosyncratic
shocks spill over along the supply chain interconnections and affect both close and remote
firms along the chain. This is achieved via precisely mapping 1) a hand-built database of
over 8,000 firm-level idiosyncratic supply shocks of diverse types, extracted from the texts
of over 5 million firm disclosures, to 2) a hand-built network of over 1 million supply chain
connections between publicly traded firms globally.
The results suggest that when firms are interconnected in the complex web of supply chains,
localized shocks are not that local: they cause substantial impact to firms even up to
4 connections away from the origin, through frictions such as the uneven distribution of
market power along the supply chains. Facing such significant risk propagation, managers
respond with significant buildups in capital financed by debt issuances, leading to higher
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financial leverages. The stock market reacts to shock spillovers from distant connections
with slower speeds: post-shock abnormal returns are persistently negative for up to 40
days. The empirical results in this paper provides the economic foundation for future
theory developments on production networks and asset pricing. I explore some of these
issues in related works.
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Figure 1.1: Visualization of Sample Supply Chain Network Shape, 2002 and 2015
This figure presents a visualization of a portion of the network: 400 select US firms from technology-
related industries (Fama-French industry codes 35 to 37) in the years of 2002 and 2015. The network data
is constructed from a combination of firm disclosures and proprietary data sources described in detail in
Section 1.2.2.
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of Shocks Across Time and Types
The top panel of this figure plots the number of total shocks captured by the disclosure data over time. The
bottom panel of this figure plots the number of each type of idiosyncratic shocks, as classified by the LDA,
over time from 1994 to 2015. The shock classification procedure is described in Section 1.2.1 of the text.
41
Figure 1.3: Example Timeline of A Shock Spillover
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Figure 1.4: Stock Price Reactions Following Close vs. Remote Shocks
The solid black line of this figure (left axis) plots the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the equal-
weighted portfolio consisting of all origin firms and their tier-1 customers, around the date when a supply
shock is first disclosed. The gray line plots the CAR for the equal-weighted portfolio of all tier-1 customers
that did not directly report any supplier shocks, The dotted black line plots the CAR for the equal-weighted
portfolio of all remote connections of the origin firms beyond the tier-1 connections. The light gray bars
(right axis) plot the daily abnormal turnovers (AT) for the equal-weighted portfolio consisting of all origin
firms and their tier-1 customers, and the dark gray bars plot the average AT for all remote connections
of the origin firms beyond the tier-1 connections. The CAR and AT measures are computed according to
Equation (1.7) of the text from 10 trading days prior to 40 days after the shock’s disclosure date. The
negative abnormal turnovers are truncated at -1% to save display space.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of Idiosyncratic Shock Data
This table presents summary statistics of supply chain shock events extracted from firm disclosures from 1994
to 2015. The top panel reports sample sizes and number of firms. The middle panel reports the breakdown
of captured shocks by major type as classified by the LDA algorithm, discussed in Section 1.2.1 of the text
and Appendix A.1.2. The bottom panel compares characteristics such as firm size, book-to-market P/E
ratio, return on assets, leverage ratio, and inventory level, between disclosing vs. non-disclosing firms. The
numbers in brackets are t-statistics for the quarterly average difference in quarterly levels of these measures
between disclosing firms and the overall sample. The definition and construction of all variables can be
found in Appendix A.1.1.
Panel A: Overall Shock Statistics
Total Number 11191
% of firms reporting at least one shock 20.06%
Avg no. of shocks per firm 5.104
No. of shocks with supplier identified 8295
No. of shocks matched to network data 8160
Panel B: Distribution of Shock Types
Types of Identified Shocks # of Events Percent sample
Natural disasters 2256 27.20%
Manmade disasters 2145 25.86%
Production glitches 2076 25.03%
IT issues 1032 12.44%
Adjustment failures 786 9.48%
Total 8295 100.00%
Panel C: Summary Statistics of Disclosing Firms vs. Full Sample
Average Reporting Diff t-Stat
Size 2.201 0.156 (1.94)
BM 0.687 -0.028 (-0.27)
PE 13.902 0.677 (0.68)
ROA 0.087 -0.023 (-0.56)
Leverage 0.411 0.039 (0.13)
Total Inventory 0.148 0.013 (1.20)
No. Obs (quarters) 82
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Table 1.4: Spillover of Idiosyncratic Shocks in the Network: Average Results
This table reports the coefficient estimates of bn, n = 0, . . . , 4 from Regression (1.1) of the text. bn measures
the average difference between firms hit with a shock spilled over from a distance of n connections, and
firms never hit with any shocks. The dependent variables in Panels A to C are growth rates in revenue,
operating income, and gross margin, respectively. Dn is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if one of firm
i’s suppliers from a distance of n connections experiences an idiosyncratic shock captured by the disclosure
data. All control variables are defined in Appendix A.1.1. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
All regressions include industry×year, fiscal quarter, and state/country fixed effects, and are in quarterly
frequency from 1994 to 2015.
Panel A: Four-Quarter Revenue Growth Rates
Distance from Shock Origin (in # of Connections)
Origin n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4
D -0.0258*** -0.0229** -0.0377*** -0.0325*** -0.0125**
(-3.32) (-2.67) (-4.22) (-3.86) (-2.44)
Control Variables
Size -0.0117*** PE 0.0034 Lev -0.0013
(-6.61) (1.48) (-0.54)
BM -0.0682*** ROA -0.0290*** Inv -0.0144***
(-20.62) (-11.28) (-4.84)
Fixed Effects X
No. Obs 335337
AR2 0.167
Panel B: Four-Quarter Operating Income Growth Rates
Distance from Shock Origin (in # of Connections)
Origin n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4
D -0.0543*** -0.0475** -0.0598*** -0.0543*** -0.0219**
(-3.46) (-2.89) (-3.65) (-3.18) (-2.37)
Control Variables X
Fixed Effects X
No. Obs 254322
AR2 0.106
Panel C: Four-Quarter Change in Gross Margin
Distance from Shock Origin (in # of Connections)
Origin n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4
D -0.0192* -0.0154* -0.0207** -0.0261** -0.0108*
(-2.14) (-2.05) (-2.75) (-2.94) (-2.12)
Control Variables X
Fixed Effects X
No. Obs 280617
AR2 0.073
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Table 1.5: Spillover of Idiosyncratic Shocks: Results Scaled by Shocks’ Original Impact
This table reports the coefficient estimates of bn, n = 0, . . . , 4 from Regression (1.2) of the text. bn measure
the incremental impact of the spillover on subsequent connections n = 1, . . . , 4 in units of the percentage
impact on the origin firm. The dependent variable is growth rates in revenue. All control variables are
defined in Appendix A.1.1. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All regressions include
industry×year, fiscal quarter, and state/country fixed effects, and are in quarterly frequency from 1994 to
2015.
Four-Quarter Revenue Growth Rates
Distance from Shock Origin (in # of Connections)
n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4 n=5
D 0.8271*** 1.0313*** 0.8762*** 0.4036** 0.1209
(3.16) (3.98) (3.55) (2.62) (1.54)
Control Variables
Size -0.0143*** PE 0.0047 Lev -0.0037
(-5.61) (1.32) (-0.32)
BM -0.0667*** ROA -0.0288*** Inv -0.0129***
(-18.41) (-10.93) (-4.50)
Fixed Effects X
No. Obs 335337
AR2 0.134
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Table 1.6: Market Power and Shock Spillover, Firm-Level Evidence
This table reports the coefficient estimates of cn and bn, n = 0, . . . , 4 from Regression (1.3) of the text.
cn is the first row of each panel and measures the average spillover impact given average values of market
power. bn is the second row and measures the incremental effect of one-standard-deviation change in market
power (or market power ratio) on revenue growth rate differences between firms with distance-n shocks and
firms without shocks. Dn is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if one of firm i’s suppliers from a distance
of n connections experiences an idiosyncratic shock captured by the disclosure data. MP is the firm’s own
market power and MPR is the ratio of the average market power of the firms’ suppliers to that of the firm,
defined in Section 1.3.3 of the text. Both MP and MPR are standardized to mean of zero and standard
deviation of one. All control variables are defined in Appendix A.1.1. All standard errors are clustered at
the firm level. All regressions include industry×year, fiscal quarter, and state/country fixed effects, and are
in quarterly frequency from 1994 to 2015.
Panel A: Firms’ Own Market Power
Distance from Shock Origin
n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4
D -0.022** -0.031** -0.027** -0.011*
(-2.58) (-2.7) (-2.94) (-1.92)
D×MP 0.026*** 0.031*** 0.024*** 0.017***
(4.73) (4.86) (3.45) (3.61)
Firm Controls X No. Obs 335337
Fixed Effects X AR2 0.178
Panel B: Ratio of Own Power to Average Supplier Market Power
Distance from Shock Origin
n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4
D -0.020** -0.028** -0.025** -0.009*
(-2.47) (-2.81) (-2.76) (-2.21)
D×MPR -0.024*** -0.037*** -0.030** -0.012***
(-3.32) (-3.78) (-2.94) (-3.20)
Firm Controls X No. Obs 335337
Fixed Effects X AR2 0.175
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Table 1.7: Market Power and Shock Spillover, Network-Level Evidence
This table reports the mean, median, and 75th- and 25th-percentile values of MP and MPR measures,
defined in Section 1.3.3 of the text, at distances of n = 0, . . . , 4 from the origin of the idiosyncratic shock
captured by the disclosure data. The computation uses the lagged value of the Size variable, which is the
market capitalization of firms defined in Appendix A.1.1. The power measures are computed as a ratio of
firm sizes to total industry sizes at the 4-digit SIC level. All measures are computed in quarterly frequency
from 1994 to 2015.
MP Distance from Shock Origin (in # of Connections)
Overall n=0 (Origin) n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4
Mean 0.3476 0.4238 0.4868 0.3867 0.2514 0.2292
Median 0.0866 0.0970 0.1109 0.0912 0.0772 0.0752
75th Percentile 0.8834 0.9278 0.9374 0.8723 0.8655 0.8528
25th Percentile 0.0249 0.0460 0.0455 0.0246 0.0105 0.0136
No. Obs 335337 8160 40469 36477 45491 44290
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Table 1.8: Input Substitutability, Inventories, and Shock Spillover
This table reports the coefficient estimates of cn and bn, n = 0, . . . , 4 from Regressions (1.5a) and (1.5b) of
the text. cn is the first row of each panel and measures the average spillover impact given average values of
market power. bn is the second row and measures the incremental effect of one-standard-deviation change
in inventory (or supplier substitutability) on revenue growth rate differences between firms with distance-n
shocks and firms without shocks. Dn is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if one of firm i’s suppliers from
a distance of n connections experiences an idiosyncratic shock captured by the disclosure data. INV R is
the inventory-to-total-assets level and γ is average supplier share, defined in Section 1.3.3 of the text. Both
INV R and γ are standardized to mean of zero and standard deviation of one. The supplier substitutability
measure uses a reduced sample where the specific values are available for each link. All control variables
are defined in Appendix A.1.1. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All regressions include
industry×year, fiscal quarter, and state/country fixed effects, and are in quarterly frequency from 1994 to
2015.
Panel A: Inventory Levels
Distance from Shock Origin (in # of Connections)
n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4
D -0.023** -0.039*** -0.033*** -0.011**
(-2.82) (-3.17) (-3.24) (-2.69)
D×INVR 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.009***
(4.36) (4.52) (4.39) (4.45)
Firm Controls X No. Obs 335337
Fixed Effects X AR2 0.171
Panel B: Supplier Substitutability (Sample with γ < 1 only)
Distance from Shock Origin
n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4
D -0.020** -0.023** -0.023** -0.009*
(-2.51) (-2.74) (-2.59) (-1.96)
D×γ 0.035*** 0.052*** 0.036*** 0.031***
(4.80) (4.84) (3.31) (3.11)
Firm Controls X No. Obs 249926
Fixed Effects X AR2 0.189
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Table 1.9: Robustness: Ensuring Shocks Have Only Firm-Specific Effects
This table reports the coefficient estimates of bn, n = 0, . . . , 4 from Regression (1.1) of the text, on 11
reduced samples where I either remove one shock category at a time (Panel A), or use one shock category
at a time (Panel B). The shock categories are classified by the LDA algorithm and defined in Section 1.2.1
of the text. The “Fire Only” category is a subset of shocks from the “Manmade” category that pertains
to localized fires only, and is constructed according to Section 1.4.1 of the text. bn measures the average
difference between firms hit with a shock spilled over from a distance of n connections, and firms never
hit with any shocks. Dn is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if one of firm i’s suppliers from a distance
of n connections experiences an idiosyncratic shock captured by the disclosure data. All control variables
are defined in Appendix A.1.1. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All regressions include
industry×year, fiscal quarter, and state/country fixed effects, and are in quarterly frequency from 1994 to
2015.
Panel A: Remove Individual Shock Categories
Category Removed
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
None Disaster Manmade Breakdown IT Adjustment
Origin Firms -0.0258*** -0.0252*** -0.0231*** -0.0225*** -0.0286*** -0.0292***
(-3.32) (-3.18) (-3.74) (-3.22) (-3.94) (-3.47)
Distance 1 Firms -0.0229** -0.0241** -0.0210** -0.0204** -0.0251** -0.0224**
(-2.67) (-2.96) (-2.60) (-2.62) (-3.03) (-2.71)
Firm Controls X X X X X X
Fixed Effects X X X X X X
No. Obs 335337 335337 335337 335337 335337 335337
AR2 0.167 0.153 0.162 0.155 0.166 0.159
Panel B: Use Individual Shock Categories and Fire Only
Category Used
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fire Only Disaster Manmade Breakdown IT Adjustment
Origin Firms -0.0174** -0.0247*** -0.0275** -0.0288*** -0.0191* -0.0199**
(-2.87) (-3.66) (-2.73) (-3.96) (-2.03) (-2.84)
Firm Controls X X X X X X
Fixed Effects X X X X X X
No. Obs 335337 335337 335337 335337 335337 335337
AR2 0.109 0.134 0.138 0.145 0.120 0.117
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Table 1.10: Robustness: Prior Growth Trends
This table reports the coefficient estimates of bn, n = 0, . . . , 4 from Regression (1.1) of the text. bn measures
the average difference between firms hit with a shock spilled over from a distance of n connections, and firms
never hit with any shocks. The dependent variables are lagged growth rates in revenue from the previous
1, 2, 4, and 8 quarters prior to the shocks’ quarter. Dn is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if one of firm
i’s suppliers from a distance of n connections experiences an idiosyncratic shock captured by the disclosure
data. All control variables are defined in Appendix A.1.1. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
All regressions include industry×year, fiscal quarter, and state/country fixed effects, and are in quarterly
frequency from 1994 to 2015.
Prior revenue growth trends
Distance from Shock Origin (in # of Connections)
Origin n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4
t-1→t 0.0012 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0013 0.0003
(0.72) (-0.54) (-0.83) (-0.61) (0.49)
t-2→t -0.0030 -0.0033 0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0019
(-1.25) (-0.89) (1.43) (-1.31) (-0.62)
t-4→t -0.0036* 0.0076 0.0039 0.0008 -0.0026
(-1.67) (1.53) (1.22) (0.69) (-1.08)
t-8→t 0.0106 -0.0056 0.0097 0.0103 -0.0034
(0.75) (-0.41) (1.19) (0.58) (-0.87)
Firm Controls X X X X X
Fixed Effects X X X X X
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Table 1.11: Robustness: Falsification Test with Random Shocks
This table reports the coefficient estimates of bn, n = 0, . . . , 4 from Regression (1.1) of the text. bn measure
the incremental impact of the spillover on subsequent connections n = 1, . . . , 4 in units of the percentage
impact on the origin firm. The dependent variable is growth rates in revenue. The first row of the independent
variables is the real shocks: Dn is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if one of firm i’s suppliers from a distance
of n connections experiences an idiosyncratic shock captured by the actual disclosure data. FAKED is the
falsified shocks: they are shocks randomly given to other firms at the time of the real shocks, constructed
according to Section 1.4.2 of the text. All control variables are defined in Appendix A.1.1. All standard
errors are clustered at the firm level. All regressions include industry×year, fiscal quarter, and state/country
fixed effects, and are in quarterly frequency from 1994 to 2015.
Four-Quarter Revenue Growth Rates
Distance from Shock Origin (in # of Connections)
Origin n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4
Real Shocks -0.0258*** -0.0229** -0.0377*** -0.0325*** -0.0125**
(-3.32) (-2.67) (-4.22) (-3.86) (-2.44)
Fake Shocks 0.0057 0.0102 0.0024 -0.0058 0.0035
(1.02) (0.79) (1.23) (-0.55) (0.64)
Firm Controls X X X X X
Fixed Effects X X X X X
54
Table 1.12: Robustness: Strategic Disclosures
This table reports the coefficient estimates of bn, n = 0, . . . , 4 from Regression (1.1) of the text, on a series of
subsamples. bn measures the average difference between firms hit with a shock spilled over from a distance
of n connections, and firms never hit with any shocks. Subsamples A and B includes all observations prior
to, and after, August 23, 2004, respectively, corresponding to the enforcement date of Provision 209 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Subsample C consists of internal shocks disclosed by the firm. See Section 1.4.1 of
the text for details. Dn is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if one of firm i’s suppliers from a distance
of n connections experiences an idiosyncratic shock captured by the disclosure data. All control variables
are defined in Appendix A.1.1. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All regressions include
industry×year, fiscal quarter, and state/country fixed effects, and are in quarterly frequency from 1994 to
2015.
Coefficient for shock dummy using different subsamples
Distance from Shock Origin (in # of Connections)
Origin n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4
Full Sample -0.0258*** -0.0229** -0.0377*** -0.0325*** -0.0125**
(-3.32) (-2.67) (-4.22) (-3.86) (-2.44)
Subsamples
A: Pre-SOX Sample -0.0206*** -0.0249** -0.0350*** -0.0338*** -0.0119**
(-3.28) (-2.61) (-4.17) (-3.54) (-2.46)
B: Post-SOX Sample -0.0272*** -0.0215** -0.0387*** -0.0324*** -0.0130**
(-3.36) (-2.77) (-4.10) (-3.85) (-2.79)
C: Excluded External Disclosures -0.0279*** -0.0268** -0.0372*** -0.0339*** -0.0117**
(-3.44) (-2.95) (-4.07) (-3.91) (-2.36)
Firm Controls X X X X X
Fixed Effects X X X X X
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Table 1.14: Corporate Response to Shock Spillovers: Financing Policies
This table reports the coefficient estimates of bn, n = 0, 1, > 1, from Regression (1.6) of the text. bn
measures the average difference in corporate policies between firms hit with a shock spilled over from a
distance of n connections, and firms never hit with any shocks. The dependent variables are changes in
leverage (DLTT-DLC divided by market capitalization), net debt issuance (DLTISQ-DLTRQ), net equity
issuance (SSTKQ-PRSTKCQ), account payables (APQ), and retained earnings (REQ), scaled by lagged
total assets (ATQ), from the previous quarter to the quarter of shocks, and from the shock quarters to the
subsequent 1, 4, and 8 quarters. Dn is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if one of firm i’s suppliers from a
distance of n connections experiences an idiosyncratic shock captured by the disclosure data. All dependent
variables are standardized to mean of zero and standard deviation of one. All control variables are defined in
Appendix A.1.1. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All regressions include industry×year,
fiscal quarter, and state/country fixed effects, and are in quarterly frequency from 1994 to 2015.
Change in Capital Structure
Leverage Financing 1
Market Leverage Net Debt Issue Net Equity Issue
Origin n=1 n¿1 Origin n=1 n¿1 Origin n=1 n¿1
t-1,t 0.007 -0.002 0.006 0.012 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.005 0.011
(0.85) (-0.14) (0.97) (1.54) (-0.31) (0.56) (-0.15) (-0.98) (0.40)
t,t+1 0.015 -0.023 0.000 -0.009 0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.007 0.005
(1.34) (-1.48) (0.62) (-0.38) (0.57) (-1.29) (-0.81) (1.14) (0.61)
t,t+4 0.086*** 0.079* 0.008 0.028* 0.035** -0.009 -0.002 -0.006 -0.001
(3.18) (1.94) (0.60) (2.22) (2.98) (-0.10) (-0.29) (-1.32) (-0.30)
t,t+8 0.085** 0.094*** 0.022** 0.047*** 0.043*** 0.014* 0.011 -0.003 -0.002
(3.07) (3.36) (2.42) (3.59) (3.87) (2.13) (1.05) (-1.41) (-0.77)
Financing 2
Retained Earnings Trade Credits (Payables)
Origin n=1 n¿1 Origin n=1 n¿1
t-1,t -0.002 -0.011 -0.015 0.001 -0.006 -0.005
(-0.62) (-1.25) (-1.09) (0.21) (-0.83) (-0.80)
t,t+1 -0.040* -0.066* -0.010 0.000 -0.007 -0.002
(-2.21) (-1.88) (-1.20) (0.13) (-0.74) (-0.47)
t,t+4 -0.025** -0.017 -0.024* -0.008 -0.020* 0.002
(-2.48) (-1.49) (-2.22) (-1.39) (-1.87) (0.94)
t,t+8 0.007 -0.013 -0.006 0.003 -0.012 -0.004
(1.41) (-1.50) (-0.49) (0.14) (-1.55) (-1.02)
57
CHAPTER 2 : Deciphering Fedspeak: The Information Content of FOMC Meetings
(with Narasimhan Jegadeesh)
2.1. Introduction
Monetary policies implemented by the Federal Reserve have profound effects on the global
economy. Numerous papers in the economics and finance literature examine the determi-
nants and effects of such policies using quantitative “Fed proxies” such as the federal funds
target rate or the reserve requirement. In addition to these hard data, the Fed routinely
releases large amounts of qualitative information, such as meeting minutes, transcripts,
and speeches, in an effort to foster effective communication with the public and achieve
greater operational transparency. While a voluminous literature examines market reactions
to quantitative information such as rate changes, very few papers explore the informative-
ness of these “soft” data conveyed in the language of Fed communications. Do they have
incremental information value? How does the market react to these data? Can they be
used as alternative predictors of economic and policy outcomes?
Our paper fills the void by presenting an innovative, topic-based approach to determine
the informativeness of FOMC meeting minutes, which are detailed summaries of everything
discussed during the preceding meeting. Because such discussions encompass a wide range of
topics, the proportions of which vary widely from meeting to meeting, we use an automated
algorithm based on Bayesian learning to objectively and robustly classify each individual
paragraph in the minutes into four distinct economic themes that intuitively correspond
to specific Fed mandates and tasks: Growth, Inflation, Financial markets, and Policy. We
then simultaneously extract contents–the tone and uncertainty level–from the texts of each
minutes, and by topic. Compared to a manual approach such as Romer and Romer (1989),
our objective approach minimizes any potential researcher-induced bias, thereby allowing us
to accurately gauge the specific context of each discussion and, for each meeting minutes,
obtain a granular measure of topic mix that human readers cannot accurately identify.
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To further remove any subjectivity, we assess the informativeness of each topic based on
financial market’s reactions to the release of the minutes.
We find several new results with our approach. First, we demonstrate that the texts of
FOMC minutes contain incremental information not incorporated in either rate announce-
ments or the more timely meeting statements, despite the fact that the minutes are released
several weeks after the meetings. Lucca and Moench (2015) find strong evidence that pol-
icy announcements on the day of the FOMC meeting is associated with significantly higher
stock market volatilities both on and prior to the meeting days. We show that, several
weeks after the meeting dates, the release of the minutes is also correlated with a similar
degree of volatility spike in both equity and debt markets.
Our next set of tests examine the granular source of this additional informativeness from
individual topics. We first demonstrate that, when treated as a single unit, each document
as a whole does not yield informative results: neither whole-document tone nor uncertainty
is significantly related to market reaction. However, the market do find the discussion on
individual topics informative, and assign different informational value to different topics.
The market finds traditional “dual mandate” themes, such as Inflation, most informative.
Interestingly, the market also reacts strongly to the content of the relatively new topic of
Financial markets, reflecting the Fed’s increasingly important role of maintaining systemic
stability, particularly during and after the recent financial crisis. Furthermore, we find that
the Policy topic is not only deemed informative by the market, but its discussion is also
orthogonal to existing economic conditions, indicating that the FOMC members do not
necessarily follow fixed guidelines such as the Taylor rule when setting the monetary policy.
Our topic-content Scores also hold significant predictive power for real economic activities,
which we explore in a related research.
The results above suggest that the Fed possesses superior information than other market
participants. Our next tests examine whether such superior information is transmitted to
the market through “soft channels” conveyed by language of the minutes. We show that
59
the price jumps at the release of the minutes do not revert, and market volatility is greatly
reduced after the release of the minutes. This is consistent with information transmission
into the market at the time of the minutes’ release.
Our paper contributes to the literature on three fronts. First, our paper is the first in finance
to use a topic-based textual analysis approach on the FOMC minutes, and our approach
provides collection of intuitive indicators on multiple facets of the economy and monetary
policy, which are also orthogonal from existing economic variables. Alternative text-based
economic indicators also exist, such as Baker et al. (2015), which is based on counting the
frequency of uncertainty-related words in news reports. By contrast, our policy indicators
are derived directly from the language of policy makers themselves. Unlike news reports,
each FOMC minutes is likely to be painstakingly scrutinized by the market, and the usage
of every word from the minutes thus matters. This is evidenced by the significant market
reaction to our measures. As such, our economic and policy indicators are likely to contain
more policy-relevant information and less noise.
Second, our paper furthers the burgeoning literature of financial textual analysis by be-
ing the first to employ a paragraph-level information retrieval system that moves beyond
the traditional word-based approach employed in current literature such as Tetlock (2007),
Hanley and Hoberg (2010), Loughran and McDonald (2011), and Jegadeesh and Wu (2013).
This paper is the first in finance to employ on FOMC minutes the Latent Dirichlet Allo-
cation (LDA) model of automated topic retrieval, which has been successfully employed to
characterize topics of a wide variety of document sources, from journal articles in Nature
to patient-discharge reports.1 Compared to word-based alternative approaches such as Sin-
gular Value Decomposition used by Boukus and Rosenberg (2006), Bayesian methods that
explicitly account for the distribution of both topics and words such as the LDA are ideally
suited to our collection of FOMC minutes for the following reasons: first, the topic mix and
content of FOMC minutes are sufficiently varied, which leads to both robust and intuitively
1For a list of LDA applications and an evaluation of their effectiveness, see Blei et al. (2003).
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appealing classification results that are on par with or exceeds manual classification by
researchers.2 Second, compared to manual approaches, our approach is entirely objective,
relying only on the structure of the provided texts, and does not require subjective input
from researchers. Third, many paragraphs in the FOMC minutes exhibit several topics
without a dominant topic. In this case researchers would have difficulty manually iden-
tifying the proportion of each topic, while our algorithm outputs the proportion directly,
enabling us to compute a unified topic-content score for each minutes.
Furthermore, we provide a model-free alternative of time-varying monetary policy. Struc-
tural models such as Ang et al. (2002), Campbell et al. (2015) and Sims and Zha (2006)
usually posit the existence of latent policy “regimes” beyond the observable data, and es-
timate such regimes in a structural VAR setting. However, the specific mechanism from
which policies are generated depends on the underlying model supplied by the researcher,
which can be subjective. By contrast, our approach directly outputs the economic and
policy contents from the texts of FOMC minutes. Our Policy Score series can be interacted
with any identifiable economic variables, thereby explicitly generating “latent” states such
as policy tone, aggressiveness, or uncertainty, etc. Therefore, our text-based measure nicely
complements the interest-rate-based structural models by providing additional rich data
moments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes our sample and data
sources. Section 2.3 introduces our automated, topic-based content analysis methodology.
Section 2.4 reports the results of our empirical tests and explores the sources of predictive
power of our measures. Section 2.6 concludes.
2We manually select 50 paragraphs and employ 10 research assistants to classify them manually into our
topic collection and to identify the topic mixture. On average the algorithm agrees with human researchers
in 46 out of 50 cases. See Section 2.3.2 for details.
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2.2. Data
2.2.1. Introduction of FOMC Meetings and Minutes
This subsection provides a brief overview of the logistic details of FOMC meetings and the
release of the meeting minutes. From the early 1980s, the FOMC holds eight regularly sched-
uled meetings per year, during which members discuss the economic outlook and formulate
monetary policy. Any policy change decided at the meeting is immediately implemented
through open market operations. Prior to 1994, no public announcement about policy was
made and the market inferred any policy change through the size and direction of the open
market operations on the next day. Starting from January 1994, specific policy changes
were made public in a short meeting statement released immediately after the meeting.
Moreover, during each meeting, detailed records of the discussions are kept, then summa-
rized in the form of meeting minutes, which are released to the public after a delay.3 The
minutes contain no new information received between the meeting date and the release date,
and instead serve as an overview of the members’ internal discussions on their economic
outlook, as well as a nuanced explanation of the rationale for any policy change.
The meeting minutes follow a highly structured writing style. They are routinely consisted
of four major sections. The first section outlines the administrative detail of the meeting
and reviews previous open market operations. The second section provides the staff’s review
and outlook of the economic and financial situation, prepared in advance of the meeting.
The next two sections provide the bulk of the economic content: the third section details
the FOMC members’ discussion of the current economic and financial situation, as well as
their own economic outlook and projections. The last section is mostly related to policy and
discusses the rationale for current policy and outlook for future policies. We remove the first
section prior to processing the documents since it is unlikely to contain any economically
3The delay ranges between three and eight weeks. The Fed implemented a series of accelerated release
schedule during the 1990s and 2000s, which shortened the lag from eight (before 2004) from three weeks
(after 2004). From 1997 onward, the minutes are released at 2:00pm Eastern Standard Time.
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meaningful content.
2.2.2. The FOMC Minutes Sample
We download all FOMC meeting minutes between the February 1991 and June 2015 meet-
ings from FOMC’s web site. Some minutes in earlier periods are only available in scanned
PDF format, and we and obtain all textual data from these PDF documents using a text
extraction engine.4 We also record the date of the meeting, and the date and earliest time
of the release of each minutes by examining the timestamp of the released file. Our sample
consists of 196 meeting minutes (thereafter referred to as Minutes).
For each Minutes, we develop a textual parsing algorithm to simultaneously achieve the
following: 1) remove the introductory section of the Minutes that lists participant names
and administrative matters, and remove the section on specific open market operations
(e.g. amount of securities purchased); 2) break the document into individual paragraphs; 3)
record the specific section where each paragraph is located (e.g. Staff Economic Discussion
or Members’ Discussion), and, 5) obtain paragraph length in the number of words. This
procedure produces 28,676 unique sentences and 5,644 paragraphs. The average sentence
length is 29 words.
2.2.3. Market Reaction Data
In many of our tests, we use high-frequency trading data from both equity and bond markets
in order to measure market reactions to the contents of the minutes as broadly as possible.
For the equity market, our main instrument is the tick-by-tick trading data from the SPDR
exchange-traded fund by State Street to proxy for the overall level of stock market response.
The SPDR, launched in 1993, follows the S&P 500 index with negligible tracking error.
Trading volume has increased dramatically since 2000, making SPDR one of the most
liquid stocks. Since volume prior to 2000 is low, we restrict our sample period from 2000
to 2015. As an additional robustness check, we also use proprietary data on the S&P E-
4Minutes downloaded in PDF at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm
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Mini futures contracts from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), which offers similar
liquidity levels post-2000. Our results are similar using both instruments.
For the bond markets, we use high-frequency electronic trading data for the Eurodollar
futures contracts obtained from the CME. To construct the trading history, we use the
“front month” contract, which is the one with expiration date closest to the trading date.
Electronic trading was sporadic prior to 2003, and as a result, for Eurodollar futures, we
can only construct a reliable trading history for a shorter sample period from 2003 to 2014.
Next, we construct our event window around the time when the meeting minutes are re-
leased. We then calculate return volatility during the event window. After 1997, the
official release time for the meeting minutes is 2:00pm Eastern Standard Time. However,
it is possible that some minutes are released early or late. As such, for each release day,
we use an automated algorithm to simultaneously search the FOMC’s official web site,
Bloomberg, Dow Jones Newswires, and Thomson Reuters, and comparing the time on the
FOMC timestamp with that of the first news story of the same day on the Minutes’ release.
We record the release time as the the earliest time that the minutes (or news about the
minutes) are reported among the these sources. The actual release time ranges between
1:59pm and 2:06pm. Therefore, we construct our event window as the 15-minute window
between 2:00pm and 2:15pm each day. Our result is robust to alternative event window
specifications. The results are also similar using windows ranging from 20 minutes to two
hours.5
We then calculate event-window return and, following convention, raw return volatility
for the equity market is computed as the squared event-window return and that for the
Eurodollar market is computed as the absolute value of yield changes. Specifically, for each
minutes t in our sample,
RSPYt =
PSPYt,2:15pm − PSPYt,2:00pm
PSPYt,2:00pm
(2.1a)
5We have used windows starting as early as 1:50pm to as late as 2:05pm. We also used window lengths
from 20 minutes to 2 hours, in 10-minute increments. The results are similar thoughout most window
lengths.
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REDt =
Y EDt,2:15pm − Y EDt,2:00pm
Y EDt,2:00pm
(2.1b)
V SPYt =
(
RSPYt
)2
=
(
PSPYt,2:15pm − PSPYt,2:00pm
PSPYt,2:00pm
)2
(2.1c)
V EDt =
∣∣REDt ∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣Y EDt,2:15pm − Y EDt,2:00pmY EDt,2:00pm
∣∣∣∣∣ (2.1d)
Because we use a very short, 15-minute window in constructing the market volatility mea-
sure, confounding effects from other macroeconomic variables are negligible, as the minutes
are released predominantly on Wednesdays and (before 2004) Thursdays, and no other sig-
nificant economic indicators are released on these afternoons.6 To further ensure that any
volatility change during our short event window is solely a contemporaneous response to the
minutes’ release, rather than a delayed response to other macroeconomic events, we separate
the event window volatility into an expected and unexpected part. Specifically, we compute
the unexpected volatility on the release day as the difference between the raw volatility and
the average event window volatility, computed per Equations (2.1c) and (2.1d), in the past
k trading days:
UVt,k = Vt −
k∑
j=1
Vt−j
k
(2.2)
In general we set k between 5 and 30 trading days. Most results in our Tables are reported
using k = 20 days. The results are little changed when k is set to other lengths. We
therefore omit the k-subscript and instead use the notation in UVt subsequent discussions.
2.3. Methodology
Because each Minutes is a summary of everything that is discussed during the preceding
meeting, it is a mixture of a wide range of topics. This is demonstrated by several excerpts
from the minutes that we present in Appendix A.2: while one paragraph discusses the
6See http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/economic-calendar for a schedule of important economic news.
Usually no other significant news are scheduled to release on Wednesdays. On Thursdays most other indi-
cators are released on the morning prior to market open.
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latest developments on inflation, another paragraph might provide outlook on financial
markets. Another paragraph might discuss both. Several complications arise from these
multi-faceted texts: First, which discussions are informative and which are not? Second,
many words have different connotations under different contexts. For example, increase is
considered a positive word in the economic growth context, but has negative connotations
in the inflation context. How do we separate these contexts? Third, the proportion and
content of discussions on each topic are likely to vary from meeting to meeting. How should
one accurately measure these proportions?
These are our motivation for using a topic-based approach that isolates the content of each
topic prior to content extraction. This approach allows us to address the above concerns
simultaneously by 1) on the paragraph level, accurately gauging the context of each para-
graph, and 2) on the document level, obtaining a granular measure of time-varying content
proportions that human readers cannot accurately identify. Overall, our approach adds
another dimension that enhances traditional content analysis. This section describes our
methodology to separate the FOMC minutes into individual topics and extract the content
from each topic.
2.3.1. The Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) Algorithm
We first classify each Minutes into distinct topics with the Latent Dirichlet Allocation
(LDA) algorithm first developed by Blei et al. (2003), which belongs to a broader class of
probabilistic topic models that use hierarchical Bayesian analysis to uncover the underlying
semantic structure of textual documents. The common intuition behind such topic mod-
els can be summarized by two statistical distributions, which constitute the latent data
generating process: The base unit of our analysis is a paragraph. Each paragraph is suffi-
ciently summarized as a distribution over a collection of topics, each of which is, in turn,
a distribution over the collection of English words used in the sample texts. For example,
a paragraph that discusses inflation should be represented by a distribution that places a
high weight on a topic that places high weights on words such as prices, CPI, inflation, etc.
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By contrast, a topic that places high weights on foreign trade and imports should receive a
low weight in this paragraph distribution.
However, the two distributions are unobservable from the point of the researcher. The
advantage of probabilistic topic models is that, using Bayesian techniques, such models
efficiently infer the hidden distributional properties from the observable data (i.e. the
collection of documents). LDA represents one particular parameterization of the model: We
assume that these two latent distributions belong to the Dirichlet family. Then, armed with
this functional form and the observed words in each paragraph, we compute the posterior
(i.e. empirical) paragraph and topic distributions using the standard Bayes Theorem. These
empirical distributions are the main outputs of the model. The only inputs in LDA are the
document texts and the number of topics. As such, compared to a manual classification
approach, researcher-induced subjectivity and bias are minimized.
We illustrate our approach with a simple example. Suppose that the full set of revelant
FOMC vocabulary consists of only V = 4 words (ignore common words such as we, the,
etc): {employment, layoff, imports, trade}. We are given D = 3 paragraphs:
1. Employment situation is good and layoff has declined.
2. Imports have increased and the outlook for trade is good.
3. Imports look good, and employment situation is also good.
A human reader would intuitively recognize that the first paragraph is about employment
and the second is about foreign trade. The third paragraph is a mixture of both. Suppose
we fit the LDA model with N = 2 topics. If the model performs satisfactorily, then first,
the posterior topic distributions should clearly and intuitively identify the topics and thus
be something similar to:
• β̂1 ≡ {P̂topic1(employment), P̂topic1(layoff), P̂topic1(imports), P̂topic1(trade)}
= {0.55, 0.43, 0.01, 0.01}
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• β̂2 ≡ {P̂topic2(employment), P̂topic2(layoff), P̂topic2(imports), P̂topic2(trade)}
= {0.01, 0.01, 0.60, 0.48}
Next, the posterior topic mixture in each paragraph should correspond to the human reader’s
intuition:
• θ̂1 ≡ {P̂paragraph1(Topic1), P̂paragraph1(Topic2)} = {0.99, 0.01}
• θ̂2 ≡ {P̂paragraph2(Topic1), P̂paragraph2(Topic2)} = {0.01, 0.99}
• θ̂3 ≡ {P̂paragraph3(Topic1), P̂paragraph3(Topic2)} = {0.51, 0.49}
We proceed with our LDA classification of the FOMC minutes simply by generalizing this
example to our sample of D = 5, 644 unique paragraphs. This set of paragraphs becomes
our document collection and our input to the LDA algorithm. Stop words, such as a, the,
etc., are removed prior to processing. This results in a collection of V = 61, 432 words.
Next, we hypothesize that there are N = 8 unique topics in the document. Our results are
robust to alternative specifications from N = 5 to N = 10.7 This is the only manual step in
the entire process. Here, each of the N topics represents a distribution over the V words in
the FOMC vocabulary, and each paragraph is a mixture of the N topics. We assume that
the observable data, i.e. words in each document, is generated from a probabilistic data
generating process parameterized as follows:
1. Each of paragraph d = 1, . . . , D contains a mixture of N topics. Let the proportion
of topic n in paragraph d be θd,n and let the vector θd = [θd,1, . . . , θd,N ]
′ represent the
true topic mixture of paragraph d. For each d, we assume that this mixture follows an
order-N Dirichlet distribution over the N topics, governed by the latent, parameter
vector µ of size N :
θd ∼ DirichletN (µ)
7Because each FOMC minutes contains at least four sections, it is likely that N ≥ 5. When the number
of topics increase, some topics become redundant. However, the algorithm results in a similar number of
major topics after grouping similar topics as discussed below.
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2. Given paragraph d’s topic mixture θd, let the assignment of each word i in document
d into topics be Zd,i, where Zd,i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. We assume that this assignment
follows the multinomial distribution governed by the document-specific topic vector
θd described in the previous step:
Zd,i|θd ∼Multinomial(θd) (2.3)
Suppose there are Id unique words in document d. Let the vector Zd denote the
collection of the topic assignment of all words within d, i.e. Zd = {Zd,i}Idi=1
3. The N topic distributions (applied universally to all paragraphs) are in the collection
β = {β1, . . . , βN}. Each topic βn also follows an order-V Dirichlet distribution over
the V words, governed by the latent scalar parameter φ:
βn ∼ DirichletV (φ) (2.4)
4. For each word i in document d, there are V choices to choose from based on our
FOMC vocabulary. Conditional on the chosen topic for word i in Step 2 above (i.e.
a draw from Distribution (2.3)), and on the structure of the topic distribution from
Step 3 (i.e. a draw from Distribution (2.4)), we assume that actual choice of the
word, Wd,i, follows a multinomial distribution governed by the resulting word-topic
assignment βZd,i :
Wd,i|
(
{βn}Nn=1, Zd,i
)
∼Multinomial(βZd,i)
Similarly, let the Wd denote the collection of the vocabulary choice of all words within
document d: Wd = {Wd,i}Idi=1
The above four distributions constitute the latent data generating process that results in
our observable document collection {Wd}Dd=1. Recall that they are not directly observable
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to the researcher. Instead, the only observable data is the occurrence of the actual words i
in each document d, i.e. Wd. We can then write the overall data generating process as the
joint distribution of latent variables {βn}Nn=1, {θd}Dd=1, {Zd}Dd=1 and the observable variable
{Wd}Dd=1:
P
(
{βn}Nn=1, {θd}Dd=1, {Zd}Dd=1, {Wd}Dd=1
)
=
N∏
n=1
P (βn)
D∏
d=1
P (θd)
[
Id∏
i=1
P (Zd,i|θd)P
(
Wd,i|{βn}Nn=1, Zd,i
)]
where P (·) are the respective (Dirichlet or multinomial) density functions specified above.
Now that we observe our FOMC document collection {Wd}Dd=1, we can compute the poste-
rior distribution of the document-topic structure given the observed documents using Bayes’
Rule:
P
(
{βn}Nn=1, {θd}Dd=1, {Zd}Dd=1|{Wd}Dd=1
)
=
P
(
{βn}Nn=1, {θd}Dd=1, {Zd}Dd=1, {Wd}Dd=1
)
P
(
{Wd}Dd=1
) .
(2.5)
Similar to other Bayesian inference methods, the numerator in Equation (2.5) and can be
easily computed. The denominator is by construction a double integral and therefore cannot
be feasibly computed. However, it can be efficiently approximated using a Gibbs sampler.
We use a customized Gibbs sampler for fast implementation and defer the technical aspects
of the Bayesian inference to the Online Appendix.
2.3.2. Results from the LDA Inference
Once the posterior probabilities are computed, we compute the posterior expectations of
two key latent variables, which represent the main output from the LDA algorithm:
1. Posterior vocabulary distribution for each topic: {β̂1, . . . , β̂N}
2. Posterior topic mixture for each paragraph in our collection: {θ̂1, . . . , θ̂D}
70
The first set of output from our LDA procedure identifies the topics. For each topic k, β̂k =
[β̂k,1, . . . , β̂k,V ]
′ , and each entry β̂k,j represents the probability that the word j characterizes
topic k. Our FOMC document collection has V = 61, 432 unique terms. As a result, each
β̂k contains 61,432 entries, the majority of which receives a weight close to zero. Table 1
reports the top 20 words for each topic. This table demonstrates that the topics are clearly
identified by the LDA, as the top words from each classified topic are mostly distinct and
identify their respective topics with little ambiguity. For example, the first topic consists
of keywords such as policy, stance, etc., indicating that this topic is about monetary policy,
and addresses the plan, performance, and outlook of monetary policies. The second topic
consists of keywords such as inflation, energy, etc., suggesting that this topic is about
inflation. In fact, the rest of the topics can be similarly identified by the top keyword from
their respective classification, as 3) market, 4) employment, 5) economic growth, 6) foreign
trade, 7) consumption, and 8) production and investment.8
The second set of output is the collection of paragraph-level topic mixture vectors, {θ̂1, . . . , θ̂D}.
From this collection, each paragraph d has one mixture, θ̂d = [θ̂d,1, . . . , θ̂d,N ]
′. Because there
are 8 topics, each vector θ̂d has 8 entries, where each θ̂d,n corresponds to the proportion of
paragraph d that is devoted to topic n. The 8 entries sum up to one for each paragraph.
We plot the time series of the proportion of each topic in Figure 2.1. The shaded areas in
Figure 2.1 corresponds to NBER-designated recession periods.
Interestingly, Figure 2.1 shows significant time variation in the proportion of the FOMC
minutes devoted to each topic. For example, from 1992 onward, a progressively smaller
proportion of the minutes has been devoted to the growth topic, which went from the pre-
dominant topic in the minutes to a much less prominent portion. At the same time, this
decrease has been offset by increases in the proportions of the other topics, particularly
those on policy, inflation and market. This finding likely reflects the dynamic roles and
8Because topics 4 to 8 are individual components of economic growth, for ease of interpretation by
human readers in some of our cross-validations, and as an additional robustness check, we group them into
one economic growth topic. This results in 4 major topics: policy, inflation, growth, and market. The results
for tests using this grouping can be found in the Appendix.
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responsibilities of the Fed over time: on one hand, it has been increasingly transparent and
forthcoming about its policy outlook and expectations. On the other hand, it is increasingly
taking up a regulatory role in maintaining the stability of the financial markets, such as ne-
gotiating the rescue of systematically important banks and the subsequent TARP initiatives
(the proportion of the market topic tripled during the recent financial crisis). Overall, this
table demonstrates that the FOMC minutes are not uniformly-written documents that al-
ways address one particular issue, but a compendium of discussions on various issues, whose
proportion change continuously over time. This highlights the importance and usefulness
of our topic-based approach.
Finally, as an additional robustness check, we randomly select 50 paragraphs from each of
the two groups that satisfy the following properties:
1. Paragraphs classified as containing ≥ 99% of a single topic.
2. Paragraphs classified as containing a mixture of two, three and four topics (each topic
having a proportion of at least ≥ 10%).9
A selection of the texts are presented verbatim in Appendix A.2. We then ask a team of 10
human readers, mostly undergraduate students at the University of Pennsylvania, to identify
the topic mixtures of these 100 paragraphs, without revealing the LDA classification result.
For paragraghs that are identified by the LDA as containing only a single topic, human
readers and the LDA agree in 49 of the 50 paragraphs (e.g. they both identify a paragraph
into the policy topic). For multiple-topic paragraphs, human readers agree with the LDA in
46 of the 50 paragraphs about the number and type of the topic. However, they often have
difficulties pinning down the exact proportions of each topic, especially when the number
of topics is higher than three. For example, many readers identify the last paragraph (4
topics) of Appendix A.2 as containing 25% of each topic, whereas the LDA offers a more
granular topic proportion mix that is potentially more accurate. This test demonstrates
two advantages of our automated topic classification approach. First, it offers an accurate
9This is done according to our grouping procedure discussed in the previous footnote.
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topic classification that is consistent with common intuition. Second, for each document,
it offers a granular, time-varying topic mixture that is more accurate than manual reading,
thereby potentially minimizing researcher-induced bias.
2.3.3. Extraction of Contents
Having obtained the estimate of topic proportions, we now proceed to extract the contents
for each paragraph-topic combination, using a bag-of-words approach similar to Tetlock
(2007) and Jegadeesh and Wu (2013). Specifically, for each paragraph, we simultaneously
extract the tone and uncertainty of each topic by tabulating the frequency of keywords in the
respective tone and uncertainty lexicons. The Tone content consists of the frequency of pos-
itive words (positive tone), negative words (negative tone), and the difference in frequency
between positive and negative tonal words (net tone) in a comprehensive tonal lexicon that
merges the Harvard IV-4 Psychosociological Dictionary10 and the financial tonal lists de-
veloped by Loughran and McDonald (2011). The uncertainty content is the frequency of
keywords in the “uncertain words” lexicon developed by Loughran and McDonald (2011).11
Since each paragraph is a mixture of 8 topics, the topic contents can be summarized in 8
paragraph-level content Scores. Specifically, for meeting t, paragraph d, topics n = 1, . . . , 8,
and content c ∈ {positive tone,negative tone, net tone,uncertainty}:
Scoretd,n,c = θ̂
t
d,nF
t
d,c
where θ̂td,n is the topic-n proportion estimate for paragraph d from LDA, and F
t
d,c is the
number of occurrences of content words from the respective tonal or uncertainty lexicons in
paragraph d. In addition, we isolate a list of tonal words that are associated with quantity
increases and decreases.12 We reverse the connotation for these words when they are used
in the inflation topic. For example, gain is considered as a positive word by both lexicons.
10Available at http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/∼inquirer/homecat.htm.
11Available at http://www3.nd.edu/∼mcdonald/Word Lists.html.
12Available at http://fnce.wharton.upenn.edu/profile/1661/.
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However, it should be treated as a negative word when used in the inflation context, because
a gain in inflation is considered negative by the Fed and thus increases the likelihood of
tightening actions. In general, a higher Tone Score indicates a more positive/easing or
less negative/tightening tone, and a higher uncertainty Score reflects a higher degree of
uncertainty in the paragraph.
Next, similar to Jegadeesh and Wu (2013), we aggregate the Scores to the document level
as the sum of individual paragraph scores, weighted by the inverse of paragraph length in
number of words:
Scoretn,c =
Dt∑
d=1
Scoretd,n,c
(
1
T td
)
, (2.6)
where T td is the total number of words in paragraph d, and Dt is the total number of
paragraphs in Document t. The term
(
1
T td
)
reflects the intuitive notion that the strength
of the topic tone is negatively related to overall paragraph length. Longer paragraphs are
more difficult to read and process, and are therefore downweighted.
Figure 2.2 plots the 10-period moving average of the document-level Net Tone and Un-
certainty Scores of each of the 8 topics over time. For ease of comparison, the Scores are
standardized to a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Similar to the proportions in
Figure 2.1, this figure demonstrate the large difference between the topic contents over time.
Specifically, Panels 2.2(a) and 2.2(b) display the Tone Scores for topics 1-4 and 5-8, respec-
tively. While most Tone Scores seem to be procyclical, some are much more so than the
others. For example, most economic growth related topic Scores are procyclical, becoming
more positive during boom periods and turning sharply negative during recressions. This is
probably not surprising because FOMC members’ discussions on this topic is likely based
on their review and outlook of the underlying economic conditions, which are likely to be
quite persistent. On the other hand, the Score for the policy topic seems to lead economic
cycles, as it usually turns half way into the cycle before other series changes direction. This
suggests that, particularly during bad economic times, the Fed seems to convey its future
(easing) policy direction via more positive policy-related languages before actually taking
74
the easing actions. This finding further suggests that the discussions on some topics are
probably more informative than others. Our topic-based approach therefore can highlight
the informative topics and construct content indices that are deemed important by the
market, and therefore useful for predicting future economic conditions and policies. The
rest of our paper is focused on assessing this ability.
Panels 2.2(c) and 2.2(d) plots the Uncertainty Scores for the corresponding topics. These
figures demonstrate a similarly high degree of variance in the Fed’s use of uncertain lan-
guages, both over time and across topics. A case in point is during and after the recent
financial crisis: the uncertainty level for the financial market topic spikes during the crisis
and the ensuing economic recession, while most growth-related topics have seen uncertainty
levels peak just as the economy was coming out of the trough. As conditions get better from
2011 onwards, uncertainty for these topics declined. Precisely around the same period, as
the Fed prepares to exit the quantitative easing programs, uncertainty level for policy has
spiked. This is consistent with the large volume of media reports that although the Fed
is more confident about the economy, it is exceedingly cautious about the pace of future
tightening. These observation suggests that the Uncertainty Scores can be used in conjunc-
tion of the Tone Scores to create powerful predictive indices. In this paper we focus on the
market reaction to the Tone Scores, and leave the Uncertainty Scores and its associated
predictive analysis to a companion paper.
2.4. Empirical Tests and Results
This section discusses our empirical tests and reviews the test results. We first assess the
informativeness of the minutes as a whole, and then measure the relative informativeness
of each individual topic and of its content using market reaction. We then relate our
topic-specific content Scores to macroeconomic variables and explore the determinants of
the scores. In addition, because a short textual statement is also released immediately
after each meeting, we compare the informativeness of these statements with the minutes.
Finally, we discuss some possible economic mechanism behind our results and explore the
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source of informativeness from the minutes by analyzing whether the price reactions to the
minutes are permanent.
2.4.1. Market Data
We examine the relation between the content of FOMC minutes and changes in aggregate
stock market and interest rates to assess the information content of FOMC minutes. We use
transaction prices of SPY to measure intraday market returns.13 We obtain SPY transaction
price data from NYSE’s intraday Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. We use 3-month
LIBOR rate implied by the nearest maturity Eurodollar futures contract as the interest
rate measure.14 We obtain transaction prices of Eurodollar futures from Chicago Mercantile
Exchange.
2.4.2. Informativeness of FOMC Minutes As A whole
We first examine whether the Minutes move the market i.e. whether market volatility
increases following its release. Specifically, we examine whether the volatility during the re-
lease window is larger on release days than on non-release days using the following regression
specifications:
Vt = a+ bLt + et (2.7a)
Vt = α+ βLt +
20∑
k=1
γkVt−k + εt (2.7b)
where Vt is the 15-minute event window market volatility (on both release and non-release
days) computed per Equation (2.1c). Within this short window, confounding effects from
other macroeconomic variables are negligible, as no other important economic data is likely
announced during this window.15 Lt is a dummy variable that equals to one if a Minutes
is released at date t. Each regression uses between 4,343 and 4,363 days of observation.
13SPY is a an actively traded ETF that tracks the S&P 500 index.
14Implied 3-month LIBOR=100-Eurodollar futures price.
15We confirm this by referring to the Bloomberg Economic Calendar of important economic indicator
announcements and find no other significant announcements during this window.
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In addition, we use daily volatilities, Vt−k, k = 1, . . . ,K, in the days prior to the release
day to address concerns about potentially biased interest rate expectations and control for
any mean reversion induced by the minutes’ release. Specifically, suppose a Minutes is
completely uninformative, but the market expectation about the content of the minutes
can be erroneously distorted between the meeting date and the release date, e.g. by interim
speeches from other Fed officials. Therefore, when the Minutes is released, the market
corrects its wrong expectation, thereby registering a higher than normal volatility. This
produces a positive bias on the coefficient estimates of b in Regression (2.7a). However,
because interim changes in expectation are also associated with changes in market volatility,
we can use the daily volatility of the k-days between the meeting date and the release date
to control for the effect of changing expectations. The estimate for β therefore measures
the true level of informativeness of the minutes, conditional on all prior expectations.
We fit Regression (2.7b) above using K=0, 5, 10, and 20 trading days. The Minutes are
released at 2:00 pm and hence we use the 15-minute window from 2:00 pm to 2:15 pm as
the event window. To facilitate interpretation, we scale all regression coefficients by the
unconditional mean of Vt across all observations. The coefficient estimates b̂ and β̂ can thus
be interpreted as the incremental volatility introduced by the release of the minutes as a
percentage of the average volatility in the event window across both release and non-release
days.
Table 2.3 reports the coefficient estimates. The estimate for the release dummy, Lt, is
significantly positive for all specifications, and it ranges from .5919 to .6130 for SPY. These
estimates indicate that the volatility on the when the minutes are released is about 60%
bigger than that during the same time on other days. The inclusion of lagged volatility as
control variables increases regression R2 since it accounts for time-variation in volatility,
but it in does not materially affect the slope coefficients.
Table 2.3 also reports the results for volatility of LIBOR. The slope coefficients for LIBOR
are between .2283 and .3054. Therefore, the proportional increase in LIBOR volatility is
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about half that for SPY, indicating that the minutes have a relatively larger impact on the
stock market.16
The result is surprising. Both Fleming and Piazzesi (2005) and Lucca and Moench (2015)
find that on the actual FOMC meeting days, market volatilities are significantly higher. By
contrast, the minutes are released several weeks after the original meetings, and intuitively,
every action discussed by the minutes should already be public knowledge by then. Our
finding that market volatility is also significantly higher on release days thus indicates that
the minutes’ language itself does contain additional, “soft” information not incorporated
in the quantitative policy announcements such as interest rates, nor are they sufficiently
conveyed by other post-meeting communications such as speeches and interviews of Fed
officials. Recent macroeconomics literature such as Sims and Zha (2006) has used structural
models to identify policy changes from observed interest rate data. Our findings indicate
that the Minutes contain information beyond the rates data and therefore can be utilized
to enhance monetary policy models without additional filtering. We examine the possible
economic mechanisms in more detail in Section 2.4.6.
Next, we examine the informativeness of the overall document without dividing it into
topics. This analysis sets a benchmark to judge the incremental information that can be
divined through topic level analysis. We compute the Tone Scores for the entire document
level relate them to unexpected market volatilities in the following regression:
UVt = α+ βcScore
t
c + εt (2.8)
where UVt is the unexpected volatility around the event window on release date t, computed
per Equation (2.2). c ∈ {net tone,positive tone,negative tone} are the document-level
net, positive, and negative tone Scores, computed per Equation (2.6) while setting all θ̂’s
16Lucca and Moench (2015) demonstrate large excess returns in equities in anticipation of ammounce-
ments after FOMC meetings. As an additional robustness check, we also extend the release window to 20
minutes from 1:55pm to 2:15pm to account for any pre-release leakage of information, or anticipation of such
information. The results within the 20-minute window, shown in Panel B of the same table, are similar to
that within the 15-minute window.
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equal to one. Each regression uses 138 observations corresponding to the minutes’ release
dates. These regressions explore the relation between the overall document tone and market
reaction. If, for example, a more positive overall tone is more informative, then we would
expect a positive correlation between tone and volatility, i.e. a positive estimate for βnet.
Table 2.4 reports the regression estimates. None of the coefficient estimates for the document-
level content Scores are statistically different from zero, with t-statistics ranging between
-1.69 and 0.32. This suggests that, on the document level, the market does not perceive the
tone Scores as useful, as neither more positive nor more negative tone Scores are associated
with higher market volatility. This suggests that when the entire document is viewed as a
single unit the document tone is not related to changes in volatility. It is, however, possible
that some topics are informative than others and the informative topics may not be evident
when all topics are simultaneously considered. Therefore, our next set fore set of tests
examine the informativeness of individual topics.
2.4.3. Relative Informativeness of Individual FOMC Topics
Although the tone of the entire document is not informative, it is possible that some of
the individual topics may be informative while some are not. For example, our discussions
with industry practitioners reveal that they consistently find the discussion on inflation to
be more informative than that on economic growth. Our next set of tests evaluates the
informativeness of individual topics.
We examine the relation between unexpected volatility the proportion of each topic, and
we also assess the informativeness of each topic’s contents using Tone Scores. We specify
the following relations between topic proportion, content Scores, and event window return
volatility for each c ∈ {positive tone,negative tone,net tone}:
UVt = a+
8∑
n=1
bnθ̂n,t + rXt + et (2.9a)
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UVt = α+
8∑
n=1
βnScore
t
c,n + γXt + εt (2.9b)
where UVt is the unexpected volatility around the event window on release date t, computed
per Equation (2.2), and Xt is the vector of macro controls variables that include:
• IntRate: the latest daily closing yield of 10-year Treasury notes obtained from the
Department of Treasury.
• UnEmp: latest monthly rate of unemployment obtained from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
• Recession: a dummy variable which equal to one if meeting date t falls within a
NBER-designated recession period.
In order to explore market reactions as broadly as possible, we fit each regression with
volatility data computed from both equity (SPY) and debt/interest rate (Eurodollar) mar-
kets. Each regression uses 138 daily observations from 2000 to 2015. In this setting, an
estimate of bn or βc,n that is statistically different from zero indicates informativeness of
a topic, or its content Score: a significantly positive β̂ suggests that the market respond
more to a more positive topic tone while a significantly negative β̂ suggests that the market
find more information in a more negative topic tone. Similarly, a significantly positive b̂ for
topic n indicates that the market finds the discussion of this topic informative, when it is
discussed more, regardless of the tone.
Table 2.5 displays the coefficient estimates from the proportion Regression (2.9a). The
growth topic is omitted from the regression to prevent multicolinearity. All independent
variables in the regressions are standardized to mean zero and unit standard deviation.
First, relative to the growth topic, the coefficient estimates for policy, inflation, and em-
ployment proportions are all statistically significant and positive. This is consistent with
the findings in Table 2.3 that the minutes do contain additional information. The findings
in this table identify the granular source of this information: the market focuses it attention
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on the languages on monetary policy, inflation, and employment situations, and do not pay
particular attention to growth-related discussions. As the discussion on these key topics
becomes more detailed (thus higher proportions), more information is transcribed in the
texts, and the market responds more.
Columns (5) through (8) present the slope coefficients of Regression (2.9a) where the de-
pendent variable is directional change in SPY or LIBOR. The slope coefficient for SPY is
significantly positive and for LIBOR is significantly negative for tone on policy. A larger
proportion of policy oriented discussion seems to be correlated with the Fed easing interest
rates, which in turn results in lower rates and higher stock market. The proportion of other
topics are not related to directional changes in SPY or LIBOR.
The left four columns of Tables 2.6 to 2.8 report the coefficient estimates for the tone
Scores in Regression (2.9b). These tables suggest that, in addition to topic proportions,
the market also views the tones of different topics differently and assigns different informa-
tional value to them. First, the coefficient estimates for inflation topic’s Net tone Score is
significantly negative, indicating a more negative or less positive tone is associated with a
higher magnitude of market reaction. This is further confirmed by the positive estimate
in Table 2.7, which shows that more negative language in inflation discussions is indeed
associated with higher unexpected volatilities. Moreover, the estimate for positive inflation
tone is not significant, further suggesting that market participants are particularly looking
out for negative discussions on inflation. A similar pattern can be found for the policy and
unemployment topics. For the policy topic in particular, the estimates using Eurodollar
volatilities are more significant than using SPY volatilities. This indicates that the short-
term debt markets are more sensitive to the discussions on monetary policy than the equity
market. Broadly speaking, these results are consistent with the notion that the market re-
acts stronger to unanticipated tightening actions (indicated by more negative discussions)
than an easing policy stance.
Our next set of tests explore the directional impact of our topic Scores. Here we examine
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whether, for example, a more negative discussion on inflation moves the market up or down.
After all, such discussion could indicate bad current conditions, but at the same time signal
future easing actions. If the market is forward looking, then its response would not be
uniform. As such, the informativeness of the topics is reflected by not only by market
volatility, but also from the relation between the Scores and raw, directional returns during
the event window. We therefore fit the following regression:
Rt = α+
8∑
n=1
βnScore
t
net tone,n + γXt + εt, (2.10)
where Rt is the 15-minute event-window equity and interest rate market returns constructed
according to Equations (2.1a) and (2.1b) and Xt is the vector of controls used in the
previous regression. This regression explores the micro relation between the topic tones
and directional returns. If the market indeed thinks that a particular tone for a particular
topic is good/bad news, then it should respond accordingly, resulting in a positive/negative
estimate for β.
The right four columns of Tables 2.5 and 2.6 report the coefficient estimates for the topic
proportion and Net Tone Scores, respectively. First, surprisingly from Table 2.6, the esti-
mates for the financial market topic is significantly negative: The equity market in particular
actually interprets a more positive tone of market discussion as bad news, assigning a 0.1%
lower with a one-standard-deviation change in the tone. This suggests that perhaps a need
to prop up the economy is more positive in tone but the market views it as a negative signal.
More significantly, the estimates for the policy and inflation topics are significantly positive
for both SPY and Eurodollar markets (for the Eurodollar market, a negative coefficient
indicates positive price movement): market return is on average between 0.09% and 0.13%
higher during the 15-minute window with a one-standard-deviation increase in the scores.
Thus, for discussions on monetary policy and inflation, the markets do view more positive
tones as good news.
Finally, note that separately using equity and debt market data in directional regressions
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allows us to interpret the exact meanings of “positive” and “negative” in FOMC languages.
The logic is as follows: while tightening actions might not have as pronounced an impact on
equity markets, they impact the credit markets more directly, because increases in interest
rates (or rate expectations) is directly translated to higher yields. From Table 2.6, the
coefficients for SPY and Eurodollars are indeed opposite in most cases: a more negative
policy tone, for example, is associated with positive yield changes and negative stock market
returns. This finding suggests that our topic-content Scores capture the degree of policy
“tightness”: a more positive tone is interpreted as a move toward easing, while a more
negative tone means policy tightening.
2.4.4. Determinants of Topic Proportion and Tone
How “orthogonal” are our granular, text-based measures from existing economic indicators?
After all, the Fed is likely to take into account current economic conditions when formulat-
ing monetary policies. In addition, a whole section of the Minutes is devoted to reviewing
current economic conditions and providing an outlook for future conditions. Many theoret-
ical and structural frameworks of monetary policy making, for example the Taylor rule, also
stiputates that monetary policy, usually proxied by the nominal interest rate, is related to
changes in economic variables such as output, inflation and unemployment. Does the Taylor
rule matter when the FOMC members are in the meeting room? This subsection specifically
examines the relation between the proportion and content Scores of each topic and current
economic conditions. From our discussion in Section 2.3.3, we expect the tone of several
growth-related topics to be procyclical and follow the traditional Taylor rule, while some
other, more “forward-looking” topics might not be the case. For example, as the FOMC
members have much latitude in their policy discussions, the effect of macro variables on the
Policy Score is likely to be ambiguous: if the Fed correctly anticipates economic cycles and
changes policy before the cycle changes, then we might not see a significant relation be-
tween policy proportion/content and contemporaneous macro variables. The Policy Score
is therefore likely to be the most orthogonal among the topics.
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We examine the determinants of the topic proportion and content Scores via the following
regressions:
θ̂n,t = a+ bIntRatet + rUnEmpt + dRecessiont + et (2.11a)
Scoretn = α+ βIntRatet + γUnEmpt + δRecessiont + εt (2.11b)
where Scoretn is the Net Tone Content Score for topic n and Minutes t, computed per
Eq. (2.6). θ̂n,t is the topic-n proportion in Minutes t estimated using Eq. (2.5). We fit the
regression using all 176 minutes Documents from 1991 to 2015.
Table 2.9 presents the coefficient estimates for the proportion regressions. The proportion
of most growth-related topics are positively related to interest rates and negatively related
to unemployment. The opposite relations can be found for the inflation and market topics.
This suggests that during bad times, the Fed is more concerned about inflation (or deflation)
and the health of the financial markets, than for economic growth and sub-topics like foreign
trade. Table 2.10 reports the coefficient estimates for the Tone Score regressions. And
here again, the tone of most growth-related topics are procyclical. Interestingly, the tone
of the policy topic is not significantly related to existing economic conditions: none of
the coefficient estimates are statistically significant. This again highlights the fact that
the policy discussions during the meetings probably incorporate factors beyond current
economic conditions, and therefore, the policy topic can serve as a leading indicator of the
economy, which is corroborated by Fig. 2.1, where its Score usually “flips” half way into the
economic cycle. We explore the predictive power of the topic Scores in a companion paper.
2.4.5. Relative Informativeness of Statements vs. Minutes
Another useful test in illustrating the efficacy of our granular information extraction ap-
proach is comparing the minutes-based Scores with the information contained in the lan-
guages of meeting statements, which are very short documents (usually one paragraph) re-
leased immediately after each meeting. These statements outline the policy decision made
during the meeting and (for later years) very succinctly discuss the rationale for such de-
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cisions. As such, the languages of the statements can also potentially contain incremental
information not conveyed by the hard numbers. Because of their very short length, the
statements are not suitable for topic-based analyses. We therefore compute the content
Scores for these statements as a whole, then compare those with our more granular Scores
from the minutes and examine whether the granular Scores contain yet another layer of
incremental information in addition to those contained in the statements.
Panel A of Table 2.14 assesses the incremental informativeness of statement languages using
market reactions on the day of the meeting, and on the day of the corresponding minutes’
release. Not surprisingly, the tone of the statements is significantly related to market
reaction on the meeting day, even after controlling for any interest rate changes made
during the meeting. This is not the case on the minutes’ release days, as the statement tone
is not statistically significant for either raw or unexpected volatility regressions.
To see this more clearly, we relate the informativeness of the statement languages to that
of the minutes’ individual topics in a predictive setting. If statements are as informative as
the granular minutes-based Scores, then their tone should be able to predict the topic tone
scores from the corresponding Minutes released for the same meeting. We therefore modify
Regression (2.11b) as follows:
Scoretn = α+ bScorestatement + βIntRatet + γUnEmpt + δRecessiont + εt, (2.12)
where Scorestatement is the overall Net Tone Score for the statement released at the same
meeting.
Panel B of Table 2.14 presents the coefficient estimates. With the exception of the inflation
topic, the coefficients for statement Tone Score are not statistically significant in all topics.
This indicates that, although informative on their own, the statement tones are not enough
to predict the tone of individual minutes topic Scores, and the more granular scores contain
information not captured by the languages of the statements.
85
2.4.6. Discussion: Is This Real Information?
This section explores the reason why the minutes are informative. On the surface, this seems
puzzling: the minutes are released a long time after the meetings, why would they contain
any incremental information at all? However, there is an important distinction: the staff
economists at the Fed and the FOMC members have access to a wide variety of confidential
economic data, such as detailed records of interbank lending, that are not observable to
other researchers. It is likely, therefore, that their information set is superior to that of
other market participants. Due to the confidential nature of the data, they cannot disclose
any quantitative facts in the minutes. However, it possible that such “inside” information
influences the tone and uncertainty level of the minutes’ language.
We can jointly test the above hypothesis and whether such “soft” information is transmitted
to the market by observing the market reactions to the minutes: if there is new information
about the future economy and the information is transmitted to the market through the
minutes, then the effect on prices should be permanent rather than temporary, and the
price “jump” on the minutes release day that we document in the last section should be
persistent and not revert quickly. In other words, because temporary price changes would
be followed by price changes in the other direction, if market volatility declines after the
minutes’ release windows, this would suggest that some real information that would have
flowed to the market after the release windows indeed is revealed to the market during the
release windows.
Figure 2.3 plots the average minute-by-minute return volatility in 15-minute bins for both
release and non-release days. First, we confirm the same pattern found in the treasury
market: market volatility spikes dramatically to about 1.6 times the normal levels on days
where FOMC minutes are released. More importantly, volatility quickly declines after the
minutes are released to about 20% lower than non-release days. As a result, the initial
price jump at the release do not on average revert back, and prices on average stay at the
new levels. This permanent “shift” in prices indicates that the overall level of uncertainty
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in the market is lower after the release of the minutes, and supports our hypothesis that
information is indeed transmitted from the Fed to the markets through the text of the
minutes, and in a permanent fashion.
2.5. Alternative Specifications and Robustness Checks
Because our granular, topic-based textual content scores are derived using new methodology,
we conduct a series of robustness checks to ensure that the economic inferences that we,
and future researchers, can draw from our methods are valid and broadly applicable, and
are not subject to the variations in test specifications and peculiarities of the text samples.
This section outlines some concerns that one might raise about using our LDA approach to
classify the FOMC minutes, and the results of our additional tests to address these concerns.
2.5.1. Shifts in Textual Sample Over Time
One might worry that over time, the writing style of the minutes might dramatically change,
thus making our approach more prone to capturing style changes rather than variations in
actual information. One particular example from our discussion with Fed personnel is that,
after 2011, the minutes became much longer and more detailed in many topics. In addition,
around the same time, the Fed began to release the actual economic forecasts by individual
FOMC members at 4 out of the 8 meetings every year. This setting allows us to test the
robustness of our methodology across different periods with different writing styles and
potentially different overall informativeness. We first separate our sample into two halves,
before and after (including) 2011. We then examine whether the overall informativeness has
changed by separately plotting the average volatility around release days, for both samples,
in the top panel of Figure 2.3.
This graph demonstrate that post-2011, the market reaction to the minutes’ release is
stronger, with the average volatility about 200% higher than normal. While this suggests
that the market does pay increased attention to the minutes, Table 2.13, replicating Re-
gression (2.9b) for the two subsamples, shows no change in the relative informativeness
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of individual minutes topics captured by our granular Tone Scores: both the magnitude
and the statistical significance of the estimates are similar across subsamples. This result
suggests that our methodology is stable even when the overall level of informativeness can
change with the writing style of the minutes.
In addition, we further separate the post-2011 sample into two subsample of release days
according to whether the preceding meetings are accompanied by the release of Summary
of Economic Projection (SEP) materials. After the April 2011 meeting, the FOMC begins
to release participants’ three-year and long-run projections of three economic indicators
and target fed funds rate, based on their “individual assessments of appropriate monetary
policy”. These projections are released immediately after four of eight meetings annually. If
the language of the minutes contain similar information to the projections, then for meetings
with SEP releases, the market reaction to the subsequent release of the minutes would be
more muted. The bottom panel of Figure 2.3 plots the daily volatility levels on release
days with and without SEP releases. The figure shows that volatility levels are similar
on both types of days, indicating that releasing individual forecasts does not decrease the
relative informativeness of the minutes, and that the information contained in the minutes’
languages is deemed by the market to be orthogonal to the SEP data.
2.5.2. Alternative Lexicons and Tone Measures
One might also worry that, as our topic classification becomes more granular, the results
are more sensitive to small changes in the tone measures that are purely attributable to
the construction of the tonal scores. To address this issue, we conduct two tests where we
intentionally magnify and reduce such differences. First, we modify Regressions (2.9b) and
(2.10), using the change of the topic Net Tone Scores, rather than the Scores themselves,
as the independent variable:
UVt = α+
8∑
n=1
βn
(
Scoretc,n − Scoret−1c,n
)
+ γXt + εt (2.13a)
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Rt = α+
8∑
n=1
βn
(
Scoretc,n − Scoret−1c,n
)
+ γXt + εt. (2.13b)
This setting potentially introduces more noise into the analysis, as the differences in tone
between meetings can be affected by both actual information and mechanically by the
construction of our Scores. Beside serving as a robustness check, this specification also serves
to examine whether the change in tone is related to volatility in the markets. Similarly, we
artificially dampen such differences by inserting the absolute value of tones as the regressors
in the above specification:
UVt = α+
8∑
n=1
βn
∣∣Scoretc,n∣∣+ γXt + εt (2.14a)
Rt = α+
8∑
n=1
βn
∣∣Scoretc,n∣∣+ γXt + εt. (2.14b)
Beside serving as a robustness check, this specification also serves to examine whether the
volatility in tone is related to volatility in the markets. Table 2.12 presents the coefficient
estimates for regressions with tone differences and Table 2.11 presents results using the
absolute value of tones. For tone changes, the results are very similar in signs and slightly
larger in magnitudes. This is consistent with the intuitive notion that large changes in
tones attracts more attention than smaller changes. Similarly, Table 2.11 shows that the
coefficients for the volatility of key tone Scores from Table 2.6 are significantly positive,
again intuitively confirming that higher variations in tone are indeed associated with more
market reaction. Furthermore, the fact that the results are qualitatively unchanged from
those in Table 2.6 indicates that our method is not subject to mechanical noises introduced
by the construction of tone Scores.
Another concern is that, although we use the Loughran and McDonald (2011) tonal lexicons
as part of our main lexicon, there might still be ambiguity in the interpretation of the tone
of some words classified as positive or negative by the lexicons. To address this issue, we
first recompute the Net Tone Score for each topic using a unified, weighted lexicon also
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used by Jegadeesh and Wu (2013). This dictionary is constructed by merging the Harvard
and LM lexicons (both positive and negative words), but instead of assigning any tonal
connotations, each word is weighted objectively according to the market reaction to the
10-K filings in which a word is used. In this sense, a word associated with negative market
returns is classified as a negative word. We then replicate Regressions (2.9b) and (2.10)
using this new Net Tone Score and present the results in Table 2.15. Again, the results
are very close to the original specification. This suggests that our approach is robust to
alternative choices of lexicons.
2.6. Conclusion
We present a novel approach in financial content analysis to determine the informativeness
of FOMC meeting minutes. This automated approach is based on the Latent Dirichlet
Allocation (LDA) algorithm, which enables us to dissect minutes into distinct topics and
simultaneously extract the tone and uncertainty level of each topic. In an event study
setting, we use market reaction to assess the relative informativeness of each topic and find
a significant relation between topic contents and market volatility. Furthermore, we find
evidence consistent of the Fed possessing superior information, which is transmitted to the
market through the text of the minutes.
Our measures of economic and policy outlook/uncertainty are both model-independent and
robust, and can be readily applied to structural macroeconomic models, as well as reduced-
form predictive models where policy uncertainty serves as an input. We are currently
exploring several of such these issues.
90
Figure 2.1: FOMC Topic Proportions Over Time
This figure plots the proportion of each topic identified by the LDA algorithm for each of the 196 FOMC
minutes released between 1990 and 2015. The raw inputs for this figure are the 5,644 paragraph-level topic
mixture vectors, {θ̂1, . . . , θ̂5644}. Each vector θ̂d has 8 entries, where each θ̂d,n corresponds to the proportion
of paragraph d that is devoted to topic n. The 8 entries sum up to one for each paragraph. The document-
level proportion are paragraph-level proportions weighted by paragraph length. The shaded areas correspond
to NBER-designated recession periods.
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Figure 2.2: FOMC Topic Content Scores Over Time
This figure plots the Net Tone and Uncertainty Scores of each topic identified by the LDA algorithm for
each of the 196 FOMC minutes released between 1990 and 2015. The raw inputs for this figure are the
5,644 paragraph-level topic mixture vectors, {θ̂1, . . . , θ̂5644}. Each vector θ̂d has 8 entries, where each θ̂d,n
corresponds to the proportion of paragraph d that is devoted to topic n. These proportions are used to
compute document-level Net Tone and Uncertainty Scores according to Equation (2.6) of the text. The
shaded areas correspond to NBER-designated recession periods.
(a) Topic Net Tone Scores Over Time, Topics 1 to 4
(b) Topic Net Tone Scores Over Time, Topics 5 to 8
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(c) Topic Uncertainty Scores Over Time, Topics 1 to 4
(d) Topic Uncertainty Scores Over Time, Topics 5 to 8
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Figure 2.3: Market Reaction to Release of FOMC Minutes
This figure plots the daily average of 15-minute raw SPY return volatility, in various subsamples, from t− 3
to t + 2 days around the minutes release days t. The volatilities are computed according to Eq. (2.1c)
of the text. The top panel shows the ratio of volatility on release days over that on non release days, for
the full sample between 2000 and 2015, and two subsamples of 2000-2011 and 2011-2015, respectively. The
bottom panel plots compares the raw volatility levels in the post-2011 subsample, between meetings with
and without the release of Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) data.
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Figure 2.4: Temporary vs. Permanent Reaction to Release of FOMC Minutes
This figure plots the ratio of average return volatility in 15-minute bins between release and non-release days.
Return volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of minute-by-minute returns in each 15-minute bins
according to Eq. (2.1c) of the text. The sample period is 2000-2015.
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Table 2.1: Distribution of Top LDA Topic Keywords
This table reports the top 20 words for each topic identified by the LDA procedure. Each column in this
table represents a topic k = 1, . . . , 8, and the weights are estimates of β̂k,j and represent the probability that
the word j characterizes topic k. The distributional assumptions for the LDA model are outlined in Section
2.3 of the text. The estimation uses 5,644 paragraphs from FOMC meeting minutes released between 1990
and 2015.
Topic 1 Topic 2 Topic 3 Topic 4
Weight Word Weight Word Weight Word Weight Word
0.0445 policy 0.0788 inflation 0.0240 market 0.0335 labor
0.0216 monetary 0.0265 energy 0.0206 credit 0.0295 employment
0.0188 funds 0.0255 consumer 0.0172 yields 0.0250 job
0.0143 reserve 0.0226 labor 0.0146 financial 0.0247 workers
0.0133 risks 0.0212 core 0.0144 liquidity 0.0231 payroll
0.0113 financial 0.0178 expectations 0.0142 loans 0.0157 manufacturing
0.0104 agreed 0.0119 compensation 0.0141 securities 0.0151 hiring
0.0100 directive 0.0111 pce 0.0126 debt 0.0147 nonfarm
0.0086 guidance 0.0108 food 0.0123 spreads 0.0138 private
0.0080 purchases 0.0103 unemployment 0.0112 equity 0.0116 unemployment
0.0074 target 0.0099 real 0.0109 corporate 0.0108 inflation
0.0071 stability 0.0090 costs 0.0107 funds 0.0104 hourly
0.0071 easing 0.0089 index 0.0106 commercial 0.0103 services
0.0068 consistent 0.0085 commodity 0.0098 bank 0.0101 earnings
0.0065 stance 0.0082 oil 0.0086 nonfinancial 0.0099 food
0.0063 expectations 0.0072 slack 0.0078 investors 0.0095 costs
0.0057 tightening 0.0069 producer 0.0077 institutions 0.0091 force
0.0056 asset 0.0067 reflecting 0.0075 lending 0.0087 output
0.0054 action 0.0065 subdued 0.0072 issuance 0.0085 utilization
0.0052 view 0.0065 headline 0.0071 bonds 0.0085 construction
Topic 5 Topic 6 Topic 7 Topic 8
Weight Word Weight Word Weight Word Weight Word
0.0208 economy 0.0340 foreign 0.0448 consumer 0.0447 production
0.0169 business 0.0315 exports 0.0381 sales 0.0369 manufacturing
0.0129 economic 0.0289 u.s 0.0335 housing 0.0354 inventories
0.0111 demand 0.0268 dollar 0.0168 homes 0.0275 output
0.0087 productivity 0.0223 imports 0.0165 mortgage 0.0266 motor
0.0076 investment 0.0219 economies 0.0164 starts 0.0223 investment
0.0072 pressure 0.0166 countries 0.0145 construction 0.0201 industrial
0.0068 firms 0.0152 trade 0.0138 income 0.0160 sales
0.0063 financial 0.0140 major 0.0135 household 0.0149 equipment
0.0058 fiscal 0.0128 currencies 0.0134 gains 0.0143 vehicles
0.0057 prospects 0.0125 industrial 0.0131 expenditures 0.0141 business
0.0056 capital 0.0118 deficit 0.0105 single-family 0.0136 stocks
0.0055 confidence 0.0117 united 0.0101 retail 0.0118 wholesale
0.0055 strength 0.0112 japan 0.0098 motor 0.0118 capacity
0.0054 sectors 0.0098 exchange 0.0097 personal 0.0112 utilization
0.0053 potential 0.0097 euro 0.0091 purchases 0.0097 ratio
0.0051 favorable 0.0088 emerging 0.0078 vehicles 0.0090 industries
0.0050 costs 0.0084 sovereign 0.0077 existing 0.0087 retail
0.0049 anecdotal 0.0080 abroad 0.0076 residential 0.0074 accumulation
0.0049 stimulus 0.0072 european 0.0073 sentiment 0.0072 factory
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Table 2.3: Market Reaction to the Release of FOMC Minutes
This table reports the coefficient estimates for Regression (2.7b), fitted using the release-day dummy, as well
as lagged volatilities using K=0, 5, 10, and 20 trading days. The equity market regression uses transaction
prices of SPY to measure intraday market returns. The Eurodollar market regression uses 3-month LIBOR
rate implied by the nearest maturity Eurodollar futures contract as the interest rate measure. The top panel
reports results using 15-minute event window market volatility and the bottom panel reports results using
20-minute window. Each regression uses between 4,343 and 4,363 days of observation.
Panel A. 15-Minutes Volatility
Equity Market Number of Lags in Control
(None) (5) (10) (20)
Release Dummy 0.5919*** 0.6081*** 0.6130*** 0.6032***
(6.32) (6.99) (7.13) (7.02)
No. Obs 4363 4358 4353 4343
adj. R-sq 0.011 0.149 0.17 0.182
Eurodollar Market Number of Lags in Control
(None) (5) (10) (20)
Release Dummy 0.3054* 0.2283 0.2665* 0.2638*
(2.02) (1.74) (2.01) (1.98)
No. Obs 2627 2622 2617 2607
adj. R-sq 0.004 0.124 0.136 0.151
Panel B. 20-Minutes Volatility
Equity Market Number of Lags in Control
(None) (5) (10) (20)
Release Dummy 0.4965*** 0.5174*** 0.5418*** 0.5084***
(5.17) (5.77) (6.14) (5.76)
No. Obs 4363 4358 4353 4343
adj. R-sq 0.009 0.134 0.161 0.173
Eurodollar Market Number of Lags in Control
(None) (5) (10) (20)
Release Dummy 0.3324* 0.2495 0.2962* 0.3019*
(2.20) (1.84) (2.25) (2.19)
No. Obs 2627 2622 2617 2607
adj. R-sq 0.001 0.125 0.137 0.146
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Table 2.4: Market Reaction to the Overall Content of FOMC Minutes
This table reports the coefficient estimates for Regression (2.8). The dependent variable is the 15-minute
unexpected volatility computed as the raw volatility minus the 20-day moving average, according to Equation
2.2 in the text. The independent variables are document-level tone scores computed according to Equation
(2.6) without multiplying any topic proportions. The top panel reports the results using scores computed
using the merged lexicon of Harvard-IV-4 and Loughran and McDonald (2011) lexicons and the bottom
panel reports results using the LM lexicons only. Control variables are defined in Section 2.4.3 of the text.
The estimates use 138 FOMC minutes released between 2000 and 2015.
Panel A. Unexpected Volatility; Merged Lexicon
Net Tone Pos Tone Neg Tone
(1) (2) (3)
Document Tone -0.0159 -0.0086 0.0031
(-1.69) (-1.44) (0.32)
Interest Rate -0.007 -0.0085 -0.0074
(-0.82) (-1.32) (-0.86)
Unemployment -0.0062 -0.0081 -0.0067
(-1.03) (-1.79) (-1.10)
Recession -0.0486 -0.0072 -0.0286
(-1.75) (-0.41) (-0.97)
N 138 138 138
R-sq 0.008 0.011 -0.012
Panel B. Unexpected Volatility; LM Lexicon
Net Tone Pos Tone Neg Tone
(1) (2) (3)
Document Tone -0.012 -0.0057 0.0046
(-1.29) (-0.84) (0.52)
Interest Rate -0.006 -0.0074 -0.0074
(-0.69) (-1.09) (-0.86)
Unemployment -0.0074 -0.0083 -0.0071
(-1.22) (-1.83) (-1.16)
Recession -0.0445 -0.01 -0.0313
(-1.55) (-0.54) (-1.10)
N 138 138 138
R-sq -0.001 0.001 0.011
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Table 2.7: Negative Topic Tones and Market Volatility
This table reports the coefficient estimates for Regression (2.9b), where the independent variable is the
Negative Tone Scores for each of the 8 LDA-identified topics computed according to Equation (2.6) of
the text. The dependent variable is the 15-minute unexpected volatility computed as the raw volatility
minus the 20-day moving average, according to Equation 2.2 in the text. The equity market regression uses
transaction prices of SPY to measure intraday market volatilities. The Eurodollar market regression uses
3-month LIBOR rate volatilities implied by the nearest maturity Eurodollar futures contract. The estimates
use 138 FOMC minutes released between 2000 and 2015.
Markets
Equity (SPY) Debt (Eurodollar)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Policy 0.0189* 0.0151 0.2517** 0.2508**
(2.28) (1.91) (2.43) (2.47)
Inflation 0.0162* 0.0206** -0.1538** -0.1832*
(2.53) (2.95) (-2.50) (-2.18)
Market -0.0154 -0.0187* -0.1917* -0.2021*
(-1.63) (-2.05) (-2.15) (-2.12)
Employment 0.0158* 0.0168* 0.0324 0.1297
(2.10) (2.27) (1.32) (0.81)
Economy -0.0089 -0.0037 0.2994*** 0.3318***
(-1.46) (-0.56) (3.22) (3.39)
Trade -0.0016 -0.0024 0.1172 0.0453
(-0.31) (-0.47) (0.80) (0.71)
Consumption 0.0015 -0.0025 -0.1826 -0.0333
(0.26) (-0.46) (-0.07) (-0.22)
Investment -0.0023 -0.0015 -0.0647 -0.1021
(-0.44) (-0.29) (-1.35) (-1.45)
Control Variables
Interest Rate -0.0007 0.2293
(-0.17) (1.04)
Unemployment 0.0181* 0.0837
(2.46) (1.16)
Recession 0.0142 0.0002
(0.59) (0.01)
N 138 138 88 88
adj. R-sq 0.054 0.069 0.128 0.142
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Table 2.8: Positive Topic Tones and Market Volatility
This table reports the coefficient estimates for Regression (2.9b), where the independent variable is the
Positive Tone Scores for each of the 8 LDA-identified topics computed according to Equation (2.6) of the
text. The dependent variable is the 15-minute unexpected volatility computed as the raw volatility minus
the 20-day moving average, according to Equation 2.2 in the text. The equity market regression uses
transaction prices of SPY to measure intraday market volatilities. The Eurodollar market regression uses
3-month LIBOR rate volatilities implied by the nearest maturity Eurodollar futures contract. The estimates
use 138 FOMC minutes released between 2000 and 2015.
Markets
Equity (SPY) Debt (Eurodollar)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Policy -0.0156* -0.0131* -0.0012 -0.0253
(-2.16) (-2.13) (-0.02) (-0.37)
Inflation 0.0005 0.0009 -0.0678 -0.0942
(0.07) (0.12) (-0.88) (-1.13)
Market -0.0277* -0.0341* -0.1553* -0.1556*
(-2.55) (-2.53) (-2.18) (-2.11)
Employment 0.0021 0.0039 0.1740 0.1246
(0.31) (0.67) (1.74) (1.80)
Economy -0.0293*** -0.0227** 0.1322* 0.1807*
(-3.71) (-2.75) (2.06) (2.14)
Trade -0.0029 -0.0028 0.1007* 0.0852
(-0.59) (-0.59) (2.03) (1.79)
Consumption 0.0036 0.001 -0.0045 0.0120
(0.53) (0.13) (-0.28) (0.13)
Investment 0.007 0.0066 -0.0244 -0.0469
(1.01) (0.96) (-0.52) (-0.14)
Control Variables
Interest Rate -0.0005 0.1619
(-0.21) (1.12)
Unemployment 0.0147 0.0800
(1.38) (1.16)
Recession 0.0118 0.1192
(0.51) (0.42)
N 138 138 88 88
adj. R-sq 0.050 0.051 0.073 0.064
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Table 2.11: Volatility Reaction to the Magnitude of Tones
This table reports the coefficient estimates for Regression (2.14a). The dependent variable is the 15-minute
unexpected volatility computed as the raw volatility minus the 20-day moving average, according to Equation
2.2 in the text. The independent variables are the absolute values of document-level Net Tone scores for
each of the 8 LDA-identified topics computed according to Equation (2.6). Control variables are defined in
Section 2.4.3 of the text. The estimates use 138 FOMC minutes released between 2000 and 2015.
Models
(1) (2)
Policy 0.0192* 0.0155*
(2.60) (2.19)
Inflation 0.0133* 0.0160*
(2.01) (2.00)
Market 0.0153* 0.0173*
(2.00) (2.02)
Employment 0.0115* 0.0138*
(2.06) (2.19)
Economy 0.0018 0.0035
(0.32) (0.50)
Trade -0.0018 0.0025
(-0.33) (0.51)
Consumption 0.0103 0.0049
(1.70) (0.68)
Investment 0.009 0.0143
(1.25) (1.96)
Control Variables
Interest Rate -0.0010
(-0.17)
Unemployment 0.0156
(1.77)
Recession 0.0157
(1.34)
N 138 138
adj. R-sq 0.068 0.070
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Table 2.12: Market Reaction to Tone Changes
Columns (1) and (2) of this table report the coefficient estimates for Regression (2.13a). The dependent
variable is the 15-minute unexpected volatility computed as the raw volatility minus the 20-day moving
average, according to Equation 2.2 in the text. Columns (3) and (4) of this table report the coefficient
estimates where the dependent variable is directional change in SPY. The independent variables are the
changes in document-level Net Tone scores for each of the 8 LDA-identified topics computed according to
Equation (2.6). Control variables are defined in Section 2.4.3 of the text. The estimates use 138 FOMC
minutes released between 2000 and 2015.
Unexpected Volatility Directional Price Change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Policy 0.0244*** 0.0274*** 0.0756*** 0.0723***
(5.12) (5.21) (5.04) (5.22)
Inflation -0.0094 -0.0187* 0.0579* 0.0547*
(-1.10) (-2.15) (2.23) (2.25)
Market -0.0144* -0.0098* -0.0738 -0.0726*
(-2.16) (-2.44) (-1.95) (-2.05)
Employment 0.0093 0.0151 0.0403* 0.0483*
(0.47) (0.71) (2.09) (2.01)
Economy 0.0013 0.0018 0.0032 0.0026
(1.09) (1.30) (0.57) (0.43)
Trade -0.0021 -0.0028 -0.0075 -0.0052
(-0.24) (-0.29) (-0.57) (-1.22)
Consumption 0.0024 0.0006 0.0042 -0.0006
(0.84) (0.17) (0.02) (-0.12)
Investment -0.0009 0.0001 0.0014 0.0023
(-0.64) (0.09) (0.22) (0.24)
Control Variables
Interest Rate -0.0025
(-0.60) (1.02)
Unemployment 0.0115 0.0119
(1.41) (0.93)
Recession 0.0153 -0.1401
(1.42) (-1.78)
N 138 138 138 138
adj. R-sq 0.058 0.077 0.014 0.027
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Table 2.15: Market Reaction to Tone Computed Using Market-Weighted Lexicons
This table reproduces Table 2.6 for different Net Tone Score measures. The independent variables are
document-level Net Tone scores for each of the 8 LDA-identified topics, computed according to Equation
(2.6), using the market-weighted lexicon developed by Jegadeesh and Wu (2013). Control variables are
defined in Section 2.4.3 of the text. The estimates use 138 FOMC minutes released between 2000 and 2015.
Unexpected Volatility Directional Price Change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Policy -0.003 -0.0073* 0.0531 0.05439*
(-0.99) (-2.11) (1.92) (2.10)
Inflation -0.0097* -0.0135* 0.0061 0.0133
(-2.05) (-2.54) (0.29) (0.60)
Market -0.0045 -0.0127 -0.0399* -0.0474**
(-0.98) (-1.96) (-2.13) (-2.94)
Employment -0.0027 -0.0019 0.0303 0.0597*
(-0.52) (-0.36) (1.72) (2.12)
Economy 0.0149** 0.0188** 0.0828** 0.0754**
(2.77) (3.13) (3.16) (3.10)
Trade -0.0183 -0.0142 0.0461 0.0519
(-1.57) (-1.26) (1.35) (1.45)
Consumption -0.0191* -0.0240** -0.0199 -0.0086
(-2.58) (-2.94) (-0.79) (-0.33)
Investment 0.0316*** 0.0343*** -0.0707* -0.0709*
(3.48) (3.92) (-2.25) (-2.25)
Control Variables
Interest Rate -0.0013 0.0191
(-0.70) (1.40)
Unemployment 0.0134** 0.0252
(2.11) (0.65)
Recession 0.0153 -0.1241
(0.60) (-0.90)
N 138 138 138 138
adj. R-sq 0.067 0.077 0.027 0.033
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APPENDIX
A.1. Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1.1. List of Variables and Their Construction
• Size: Market capitalization of firms as of December of the previous calendar year.
Computed as (PRC×SHROUT) with both variables obtained from CRSP (domestic
firms) and Compustat Daily Price data (international firms).
• BM : Ratio of book equity to market capitalization as of December of the previous
calendar year.
• PE: Price adjusted for splits (PRC/CFACPR) divided by adjusted earnings per share
(EPSPX/AJEX).
• ROA: Net profits after taxes (NI) plus interest expenses (XINT) divided by total
assets (AT) as of December of the previous calendar year.
• Lev: Long-term liabilities (DLTT) plus short-term liabilities (DLC) divided by market
capitalization as of December of the previous calendar year.
• INV L: Total inventory (INVTQ) divided by total assets (ATQ) in quarter t− 1.
• GM : Gross margin, computed as revenue (SALEQ) minus cost of goods sold (COGSQ)
divided by revenue in quarter t.
• CAPEX: Capital expenditure (CAPXQ) divided by total assets (ATQ) in quarter
t− 1.
• RD: Research and development expenditure (XRDQ) divided by total assets (ATQ)
in quarter t− 1.
• Cash: Cash and short-term investments (CHEQ) divided by total assets (ATQ) in
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quarter t− 1.
• RE: Retained earnings (REQ) divided by total assets (ATQ) in quarter t− 1.
• NEI: Net equity issuance, computed as sale of common and preferred stock (SSTKQ)
minus purchase of common and preferred stock (PRSTKCQ), divided by total assets
(ATQ) in quarter t− 1.
• NDI: Net debt issuance, computed as long-term debt issuance (DLTISQ) minus
long-term debt reduction (DLTRQ), divided by total assets (ATQ) in quarter t− 1.
• Dn: Dummy variable that equals to 1 if one of the firm’s supplier at a distance of n
connections experiences a shock.
• γ: Supply relationship share, computed as γji,t =
Vji,t
COGSi,t
.
• MP : Market power measure computed as MPi,t =
Sizei,t−1∑Ni
k Sizek,t−1
, where Size is
defined above.
A.1.2. Data Construction Methodologies
The LDA Algorithm
Prior to the advent of probabilistic topic models, the classification of textual documents and
the inference of their contexts are done either manually or in a static fashion using word-
based approaches such as keyword searches or latent semantic analysis. Probabilistic topic
models such as the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) algorithm remove this limitation and
allow for automated and accurate classification of documents on a large, “big data” scale.
First developed by Blei et al. (2003), the LDA belongs to a broader class of probabilistic
topic models that use hierarchical Bayesian analysis to uncover the underlying semantic
structure of textual documents. The advantage of this approach is discussed in the main
text. Here I first illustrate the approach with a simple example. Suppose that the full
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vocabulary used in firm disclosures consists of only V = 4 words (ignore common words
such as I, the, etc): {earthquake, demolish, economy, consumption}. Suppose there are
D = 3 disclosures:
1. An earthquake demolished our factory.
2. We are unable to meet consumer demand due to strong economy.
3. An earthquake demolished our factory. In addition consumer demand is very strong
due to the economy, so we are unable to meet the demands.
A human reader would intuitively recognize that the first document is primarily in the
context of natural disasters and the second is about an economy-driven demand shock. The
third document is a mixture of both. Suppose I fit the LDA model with N = 2 topics. If
the model performs satisfactorily, then first, the posterior topic distributions should clearly
and intuitively identify the topics and thus be something similar to:
• β̂1 ≡ {P̂topic1(earthquake), P̂topic1(demolish), P̂topic1(economy), P̂topic1(consumer)}
= {0.55, 0.43, 0.01, 0.01}
• β̂2 ≡ {P̂topic2(earthquake), P̂topic1(demolish), P̂topic1(economy), P̂topic1(consumer)}
= {0.01, 0.01, 0.60, 0.48}
Next, the posterior topic mixture in each document should correspond to the human reader’s
intuition:
• θ̂1 ≡ {P̂document1(Topic1), P̂document1(Topic2)} = {0.99, 0.01}
• θ̂2 ≡ {P̂document2(Topic1), P̂document2(Topic2)} = {0.01, 0.99}
• θ̂3 ≡ {P̂document3(Topic1), P̂document3(Topic2)} = {0.51, 0.49}
I proceed with my LDA classification of firm disclosures by generalizing this example to
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the sample of D = 19, 771 disclosures. Stop words, location and industry-specific terms,
and other commonly appearing words, such as a, the, etc., are removed prior to processing.
This results in a collection of V = 53, 971 English words.1
I hypothesize that there are N = 20 unique topics in the document. Here, each of the N
topics represents a distribution over the V words in the disclosure vocabulary, and each
document is a mixture of the N topics. I assume that the observable data, i.e. words in
each document, is generated from a probabilistic data generating process parameterized as
follows:
1. Each of document d = 1, . . . , D contains a mixture of N topics. Let the proportion
of topic n in document d be θd,n and let the vector θd = [θd,1, . . . , θd,N ]
′ represent the
true topic mixture of document d. For each d, I assume that this mixture follows an
order-N Dirichlet distribution over the N topics, governed by the latent, parameter
vector µ of size N :
θd ∼ DirichletN (µ)
2. Given document d’s topic mixture θd, let the assignment of each word i in document d
into topics be Zd,i, where Zd,i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. I assume that this assignment follows the
multinomial distribution governed by the document-specific topic vector θd described
in the previous step:
Zd,i|θd ∼Multinomial(θd) (A.1)
Suppose there are Id unique words in document d. Let the vector Zd denote the
collection of the topic assignment of all words within d, i.e. Zd = {Zd,i}Idi=1
3. The N topic distributions (applied universally to all documents) are in the collection
β = {β1, . . . , βN}. Each topic βn also follows an order-V Dirichlet distribution over
1I do not stem the words before processing i.e. each inflection of a word is treated as a new word.
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the V words, governed by the latent scalar parameter φ:
βn ∼ DirichletV (φ) (A.2)
4. For each word i in document d, there are V choices to choose from the disclosure
vocabulary. Conditional on the chosen topic for word i in Step 2 above (i.e. a draw
from Distribution (A.1)), and on the structure of the topic distribution from Step 3
(i.e. a draw from Distribution (A.2)), I assume that actual choice of the word, Wd,i,
follows a multinomial distribution governed by the resulting word-topic assignment
βZd,i :
Wd,i|
(
{βn}Nn=1, Zd,i
)
∼Multinomial(βZd,i)
Similarly, let the Wd denote the collection of the vocabulary choice of all words within
document d: Wd = {Wd,i}Idi=1
The above four distributions constitute the latent data generating process that results in
my observable document collection {Wd}Dd=1. Recall that they are not directly observable
to the researcher. Instead, the only observable data is the occurrence of the actual words
i in each document d, i.e. Wd. I can then write the overall data generating process as the
joint distribution of latent variables {βn}Nn=1, {θd}Dd=1, {Zd}Dd=1 and the observable variable
{Wd}Dd=1:
P
(
{βn}Nn=1, {θd}Dd=1, {Zd}Dd=1, {Wd}Dd=1
)
=
N∏
n=1
P (βn)
D∏
d=1
P (θd)
[
Id∏
i=1
P (Zd,i|θd)P
(
Wd,i|{βn}Nn=1, Zd,i
)]
where P (·) are the respective (Dirichlet or multinomial) density functions specified above.
Now that I observe my firm disclosure collection {Wd}Dd=1, I can compute the posterior
distribution of the document-topic structure given the observed documents using Bayes’
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Rule:
P
(
{βn}Nn=1, {θd}Dd=1, {Zd}Dd=1|{Wd}Dd=1
)
=
P
(
{βn}Nn=1, {θd}Dd=1, {Zd}Dd=1, {Wd}Dd=1
)
P
(
{Wd}Dd=1
) .
(A.3)
Similar to other Bayesian inference methods, the numerator in Equation (A.3) can be easily
computed. The denominator is by construction a double integral and therefore cannot be
feasibly computed. However, it can be efficiently approximated using a Gibbs sampler. I
use a customized Gibbs sampler written in C++ for fast implementation.
Once the posterior probabilities are computed, I compute the posterior expectations of two
key latent variables, which represent the main output from the LDA algorithm:
1. Posterior vocabulary distribution for each topic: {β̂1, . . . , β̂N}
2. Posterior topic mixture for each document in my collection: {θ̂1, . . . , θ̂D}
The first set of output from my LDA procedure identifies the topics. For each topic k, β̂k =
[β̂k,1, . . . , β̂k,V ]
′ , and each entry β̂k,j represents the probability that the word j characterizes
topic k. My whole collection of 8-K and other disclosures has V = 72, 442 unique terms.
As a result, each β̂k contains 72,442 entries, the majority of which receives a weight close to
zero. The top 5 keywords for each topic are reported in Table 1.2. The main text interprets
of these topics.
The second set of output is the collection of document-level topic mixture vectors, {θ̂1, . . . , θ̂D}.
From this collection, each document d has one mixture, θ̂d = [θ̂d,1, . . . , θ̂d,N ]
′. Because there
are 20 topics, each vector θ̂d has 20 entries, where each θ̂d,n corresponds to the proportion
of document d that is devoted to topic n. The 20 entries sum up to one for each document.
I keep the disclosure only if it contains more than 95% of a single topic. The main text
then discusses the contexts of these topics and that these topics help identify shocks that
are idiosyncratic in causes.
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Network Data
I start at the year 1994, when computerized filing records become available in SEC’s EDGAR
system. For each firm pair ji, I identify them as in a supply relationship if either firm
discloses the relationship in a filing, or either firm is identified in the other sources. The
relationship is removed if either party discloses its termination. Note that in this setting,
I do not capture the value of the relationships. Therefore, if supplier j and customer i are
in a relationship at t, I set the relationship dummy γji,t = 1 and 0 otherwise. A smaller
portion of my sample (e.g. those identified by Bloomberg or the import-export data) does
report relations with specific dollar values. In this case where firm j supplies Vji,t worth of
goods to firm i in year t, I set γji,t =
Vji,t
COGSi,t−1
. This restricted sample is useful in several
robustness checks.
In essence, the existence (and for a smaller sample, the magnitude) of supply chain linkages
between firms are captured by the relationship indicator γji. For my sample of N = 10, 930
firms, I organize all γij parameters in the following N-by-N matrix:
Γt =

γ11,t ... γ1N,t
...
. . .
...
γN1,t ... γNN,t
 (A.4)
In this matrix, if firms i and j have no direct customer-supplier relationship, γij = γji = 0.
Otherwise, the non-zero entries in Γ represent direct customer-supplier relationships, or
supply chain linkages. Note that Γ needs not be symmetric. For example, if firm j is a
supplier of i, but does not purchase any input from i, then γji is nonzero while γij is zero. In
the smaller sample where γji < 1, the sum of the ith row conveys the significance of firm i
to the economy, while the sum of ith column measures firm i’s degree of reliance on external
intermediate goods. In this case each column sums to less than one by construction.2
2This ensures that Γ′ has positive eigenvalues and the inverse, (I − Γ′)−1, is not singular. I use this
inverse extensively in a related paper to compute the centrality of each firm.
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The relationships in this economy, summarized in Γ, constitute a directed network where
each firm i is a node and each relationship γij , if nonzero, is a link that points from firm i
(supplier) to firm j (customer). Equivalently, the supply chain network can be visualized
as a directed graph where Γ represents the adjacency matrix of this graph. The main text
then discusses the summary statistics of this network.
Finally, an important reason to represent the linkages in a network structure is to gauge
the effect of supply chain linkages beyond the immediate connections. To illustrate this,
Figure 1.1 presents a visualization of a portion of the network: 400 select US firms from
technology-related industries (Fama-French industry codes 35 to 37) in the years of 2002 and
2015, respectively. There are few isolated nodes within the network. For many firms, the
supply chain can be quite long, even extending to fourth- and fifth-tier suppliers. These firms
will be subject to additional shocks if shocks can spill over beyond the closest connections
into customers further downstream. I empirically document these spillovers in Section 1.3.
A.1.3. Additional Event Text Examples
This section lists several examples for each category of shocks characterized by the LDA
algorithm. Category 1 consists of events caused by economy- or industry-wide systematic
factors. Category 2 consists of events caused by potentially idiosyncratic factors but could
also caused by industry-wide issues. Category 3 consists of events caused by idiosyncratic
factors.
• Example 1A, Economic Issues: [The firm] announced its plan to cancel the development of...power
plant that it had planned to construct...because of...reduced customer demand for electricity due to the
recession and slow economic recovery, surplus generating capacity in the Midwest market, and lower
natural gas prices linked to expanded shale gas supplies. (CMS Energy Corp 8-K)
• Example 1B, Industry Issues: Ford Motor Co. is scrambling to find enough steel frames to keep
up with demand...frame’s main supplier...was having trouble building enough of the parts to keep pace
with production needs....Ford has had to cancel planned overtime at the plants and has temporarily
halted assembly lines during regular shifts as workers waited for more frames to arrive. (Wall Street
Journal)
• Example 2A, Labor Issues: Yue Yuen Industrial Holdings Ltd., which makes shoes for Adidas
AG and Nike Inc., said production...was disrupted as workers upset with organizational changes went
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on strike. About 2,000 employees...were affected...The strike cost the company $27 million in direct
costs, including lost profits and additional air freight costs. (Reuters)
• Example 2B, QC Issues: As part of ongoing quality assurance, Intel Corporation has discovered a
design issue in a recently released support chip..Intel has stopped shipment of the affected support chip
from its factories..and expects full volume recovery in April..Intel expects this issue to reduce revenue
by approximately $300 million as the company discontinues production. (Intel 8-K)
• Example 3B, Natural Disasters Hitting Supplier: As a result of the earthquake...supplier
suspended manufacturing operations at the factory where these materials are produced...We currently
have inventory of these materials...through May 24, 2011...However, many of the factors in this
situation are beyond our control, and an unfavorable development relating to any of these factors
could have a material adverse effect on our results of operations. (A123 Systems 8-K)
• Example 3C, Manmade Disasters: [A] blaze occurred Sept. 4 during the installation of equipment
at a factory...for SK Hynix...It will take at least half a year before SK Hynix’s damaged clean room is
fully rebuilt...if...production is halted for more than a week, substantial shortages could lead to higher
prices, benefiting all memory-chip manufacturers...customers include Apple, Samsung, Lenovo Group
Ltd., Dell Inc. and Sony Corp. (Bloomberg)
• Example 3D, Production Disruptions: Rio Tinto Alcan’s Laterriere Works aluminium smelter
in Quebec suffered a significant power outage yesterday...leaving the plant without the adequate energy
required to continue operating at full capacity...one of two production lines has been suspended...in
the coming weeks, Rio Tinto Alcan will mobilise the necessary resources to restore the suspended line.
(Rio Tinto Press Release)
• Example 3E, Adoption Failures: [The] Company has experienced a backlog of orders with a
significant contract manufacturer in China...while the Company had thought such manufacturing de-
lays would be temporary, the Company learned recently that this supplier had ceased manufacturing
products for the Company due to difficulties the supplier is experiencing...The timing for resuming
production of the products previously manufactured by this supplier is uncertain, and will depend to a
significant extent on whether the Company is able to obtain certain custom tooling used by the supplier
to manufacture the Company’s products. (Loud Technologies 8-K)
A.1.4. Additional Extensions and Robustness Tests
See the Online Appendix for the complete list of additional robustness checks. The first issue
is to check whether firms endogenous decisions to enter into their network positions (and
inventory) introduce any bias on the interaction regressions such as Regression (1.5a) and
(1.5b). To do so, I exploit exogeneous variations in inventory determined by the length of
lead time, which is in turn determined crucially by 1) distance to the supplier and 2) mode of
transportation (land vs. sea). I also use two alternative measures of supplier substitutability
derived from Giannetti et al. (2011) and also used by Barrot and Sauvagnat (2014). These
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measures are based on industry rather than firm characteristics. I find similar results with
these alternative measures.
Next, because the distribution of network linkages is uneven, linear regressions could result
in the observation of “spillover effects” purely due to taking averages on uneven links.
This is ruled out by computing the average degree of asymmetry at each distance from
the shock, then showing that links with high values are not necessarily followed by more
links with high values. The linearity issue is further ruled out with similar results from a
matching approach. In another test, I use only natural disasters reported by US National
Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the suppliers’ geographical locations as
an alternative source of shocks, and find broadly similar results.
A.2. Appendix for Chapter 2
A.2.1. Part 1. Single Topic Examples
Example 1. (99% growth mandate, other topics negligible)
With regard to developments and prospects in key sectors of the economy, members noted
that despite further survey indications of eroding consumer confidence, consumer expendi-
tures had strengthened in recent months after a pause earlier in the year. The pickup had
featured rising sales of motor vehicles, and while the latter had slipped recently, a number
of special factors such as shortages of popular models at the end of the model year and the
effects of flooding in some parts of the Midwest suggested the need to withhold judgment
on any downward shift in the underlying demand for motor vehicles. Tourism was reported
to have strengthened considerably in many areas this summer, though there were major
exceptions. As had been true for an extended period, consumer attitudes continued to be
inhibited by concerns about employment opportunities, especially given further reductions
in defense spending, the ongoing restructuring and related downsizing of many business op-
erations, and the continuing efforts by business firms to limit the number of their permanent
employees in order to hold down the rising costs of health care and other nonwage worker
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benefits. Members noted, however, that the growth in employment thus far this year, while
tending to involve many low paying jobs, had greatly exceeded the rate of expansion in
1992. In the view of at least some members, appreciable further growth was likely as busi-
ness firms found it increasingly difficult in an expanding economy to meet growing demands
through outsourcing, temporary workers, and overtime work. Some members also noted
that the newly legislated taxes on higher incomes would tend to curtail some consumer
spending. The timing of that effect was uncertain; tax liabilities had already risen, but
some payments on the added tax liabilities were not due until April of 1994 and 1995.
Example 2. Inflation Mandate (99% inflation mandate, other topics negligible)
The core consumer price index advanced at a faster rate in the first quarter than it had in the
fourth quarter, reflecting the pass-through of higher energy prices and a leveling off of goods
prices after sizable declines last year. The higher goods price inflation owed, in part, to the
recent run-up in the prices of non-oil imports, energy, and other commodities. The price
index for core personal consumption expenditures also rose at a faster rate in the first quarter
than it had late last year. Despite the rise in inflation this year, however, the cumulative
increase in the overall consumer price index for the year ending in March was somewhat
less than the advance for the twelve months ending in March 2003. In the year ending
in March, the increase in the price index for total personal consumption expenditures was
similar to that of a year earlier. Survey measures of near-term inflation expectations edged
up somewhat in March and April, but measures of longer-term expectations decreased. With
regard to labor costs, average hourly earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers on
private nonfarm payrolls rose notably less for the twelve months ending in March than
they had in the year-earlier period. The overall increase in the employment cost index for
private industry for the twelve months ending in March was about the same as that for the
twelve-month period ending a year earlier, as wages and salaries decelerated and benefits
accelerated.
Example 3. Financial Market Mandate (99% market mandate, other topics negligible)
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Participants noted that financial markets were volatile over the intermeeting period, as
investors responded to news on the European fiscal situation and the negotiations regarding
the debt ceiling in the United States. However, the broad declines in stock prices and interest
rates over the intermeeting period were seen as mostly reflecting the incoming data pointing
to a weaker outlook for growth both in the United States and globally as well as a reduced
willingness of investors to bear risk in light of the greater uncertainty about the outlook.
While conditions in funding markets had tightened, it was noted that the condition of U.S.
banks had strengthened in recent quarters and that the credit quality of both businesses
and households had continued to improve.
Example 4. Policy Mandate (99% policy mandate, other topics negligible)
Participants discussed a number of policy tools that the Committee might employ if it
decided to provide additional monetary accommodation to support a stronger economic
recovery in a context of price stability. One of the policy options discussed was an extension
of the period over which the Committee expected to maintain its target range for the federal
funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent. It was noted that such an extension might be particularly
effective if done in conjunction with a statement indicating that a highly accommodative
stance of monetary policy was likely to be maintained even as the recovery progressed. Given
the uncertainty attending the economic outlook, a few participants questioned whether the
conditionality of the forward guidance was sufficiently clear, and they suggested that the
Committee should consider replacing the calendar date with guidance that was linked more
directly to the economic factors that the Committee would consider in deciding to raise its
target for the federal funds rate, or omit the forward guidance language entirely.
A.2.2. Part 2. Multiple Topic Examples
Example 5. (56% growth, 43% inflation)
The information reviewed at this meeting suggested that economic activity had weakened
further in the opening months of the year. Production cutbacks were evident in a wide range
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of industries, and private payrolls had fallen markedly, especially in the goods producing
sector. On the positive side, consumer confidence had rebounded sharply since the cease-fire
in the Persian Gulf, retail sales and housing starts had strengthened recently, and exports
had continued to expand. Broad measures of prices had slowed or contracted in January
and February, but excluding energy and food prices, increases in those measures were higher
than in previous months. Wage increases had moderated over the past several months.
Example 6. (83% financial market, 17% policy)
Committee members and Board members agreed that, with few exceptions, the functioning
of most financial markets, including interbank markets, no longer showed significant im-
pairment. Accordingly they agreed that the statement to be released following the meeting
would indicate that the Federal Reserve would be closing the Asset-Backed Commercial Pa-
per Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility,
the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, and the Term Securities Lending Facility on February 1,
2010. Committee members also agreed to announce that temporary liquidity swap arrange-
ments between the Federal Reserve and other central banks would expire on February 1. In
addition, the statement would say that amounts available through the Term Auction Facility
would be scaled back further, with 50billionof28−daycredittobeofferedonFebruary8and25
billion of 28-day credit to be offered at the final auction of March 8. The statement also
would note that the anticipated expiration dates for the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan
Facility remained June 30, 2010, for loans backed by new-issue commercial mortgage-backed
securities, and March 31, 2010, for loans backed by all other types of collateral. Members
emphasized that they were prepared to modify these plans if necessary to support financial
stability and economic growth.
Example 7. (34% growth, 31% financial market, 35% policy)
Open market operations during the intermeeting period continued to be directed toward
maintaining the existing degree of pressure on reserve positions. The federal funds rate rose
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briefly in response to year-end pressures, but it otherwise tended to remain close to the
5-1/4 percent level expected with an unchanged policy stance. Other short-term interest
rates generally were unchanged to slightly higher over the intermeeting period. Rates on
intermediate- and long-term securities edged higher on balance in reaction to incoming data
on economic activity that were on the firm side of market expectations; the increases in
such rates appeared to be tempered, however, by favorable market reactions to new data on
wages and prices. The generally positive news on economic growth and inflation along with
favorable reports on earnings appeared to reinforce the optimism of equity market investors,
and major indexes of stock prices increased markedly further over the intermeeting period.
Example 8. (39% growth, 13% inflation, 20% financial market, 26% policy)
In their discussion of the economic situation and outlook, FOMC meeting participants indi-
cated that the worsening financial situation, the slowdown in growth abroad, and incoming
information on economic activity had led them to mark down significantly their outlook for
growth. While economic activity had evidently already been slowing over the summer, the
turmoil in recent weeks had apparently resulted in tighter financial conditions and greater
uncertainty among businesses and households about economic prospects, further limiting
their ability and willingness to make significant spending commitments. Recent measures
of business and consumer sentiment had fallen to historical lows. Participants generally
expected the economy to contract moderately in the second half of 2008 and the first half
of 2009, and agreed that the downside risks to growth had increased. While some expected
an improving financial situation to contribute to a recovery in growth by mid-2009, others
judged that the period of economic weakness could persist for some time. Several par-
ticipants indicated that they expected some fiscal stimulus in coming quarters, but they
were uncertain about the extent and duration of the resulting support to economic activity.
Participants agreed that in coming quarters inflation was likely to move down to levels
consistent with price stability, reflecting the recent declines in the prices of energy and
other commodities, the appreciation of the dollar, and the expected widening of margins
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of resource slack. Indeed, some saw a risk that over time inflation could fall below lev-
els consistent with the Federal Reserve’s dual objectives of price stability and maximum
employment.
125
BIBLIOGRAPHY
D. Acemoglu, V. M. Carvalho, A. Ozdaglar, and A. Tahbaz-Salehi. The network origins of
aggregate fluctuations. Econometrica, 80(5):1977–2016, 2012.
D. Acemoglu, A. Ozdaglar, and A. Tahbaz-Salehi. Networks, Shocks, and Systemic Risk.
Working Paper, Massechusettes Institute of Technology, 2015.
G. Afonso, A. Kovner, and A. Schoar. Trading partners in the interbank lending market.
Working Paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2015.
K. Ahern. Network centrality and the cross section of stock returns. Working Paper, Uni-
versity of Southern California, 2012.
A. Ang, J. Boivin, S. Dong, and R. Loo-Kung. Monetary policy shifts and the term struc-
ture. 78(2):429–457, 2002.
E. Ang, D. A. Iancu, R. Swinney, et al. Disruption risk and optimal sourcing in multi-tier
supply networks. Working Paper, Stanford University, 2014.
R. Anupindi and R. Akella. Diversification under supply uncertainty. Management Science,
39(8):944–963, 1993.
E. Bajo, T. Chemmaunr, K. Simonyan, and H. Tehranian. Underwriter networks, investor
attention, and initial public offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, Forthcoming,
2015.
S. R. Baker, N. Bloom, and S. J. Davis. Measuring economic policy uncertainty. NBER
Working Paper No. 21633, 2015.
S. Banerjee, S. Dasgupta, and Y. Kim. Buyer–supplier relationships and the stakeholder
theory of capital structure. The Journal of Finance, 63(5):2507–2552, 2008.
J.-N. Barrot and J. Sauvagnat. Input Specificity and the Propagation of Idiosyncratic Shocks
in Production Networks. Working Paper, Massechusettes Institute of Technology, 2014.
N. Bergman, R. Iyer, and R. Thakor. Financial accelerator at work: Evidence from corn
fields. Working Paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2015.
M. Billio, M. Getmansky, A. W. Lo, and L. Pelizzon. Econometric measures of connect-
edness and systemic risk in the finance and insurance sectors. Journal of Financial
Economics, 104(3):535–559, 2012.
D. M. Blei, A. Y. Ng, and M. I. Jordan. Latent dirichlet allocation. Journal of machine
Learning research, 3:993–1022, 2003.
C. Boehm, A. Flaaen, and N. Pandalai-Nayar. Input Linkages and the Transmission of
126
Shocks: Firm-Level Evidence from the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake. Working Paper, Fed
Board of Governors, 2014.
E. Boukus and J. V. Rosenberg. The information content of FOMC minutes. Working
paper, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY, 2006.
J. Y. Campbell, C. Pflueger, and L. M. Viceira. Monetary policy drivers of bond and equity
risks. Working paper, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2015.
L. Cohen and A. Frazzini. Economic links and predictable returns. Journal of Finance, 63
(4):1977–2011, 2008.
L. Cohen and D. Lou. Complicated firms. Journal of financial economics, 104(2):383–400,
2012.
L. Cohen, A. Frazzini, and C. Malloy. The small world of investing: Board connections and
mutual fund returns. Journal of Political Economy, 116:951–979, 2008.
L. Cohen, A. Frazzini, and C. Malloy. Sell-side school ties. The Journal of Finance, 65(4):
1409–1437, 2010.
E. Cohen-Cole, A. Kirilenko, and E. Patacchini. Trading networks and liquidity provision.
Journal of Financial Economics, 113(2):235–251, 2014.
O. Dessaint and A. Matray. Do Managers Overreact to Salient Risks? Evidence from
Hurricane Strikes. Working Paper, University of Toronto, 2015.
C. E. Fee, C. J. Hadlock, and S. Thomas. Corporate equity ownership and the governance
of product market relationships. The Journal of Finance, 61(3):1217–1251, 2006.
M. J. Fleming and M. Piazzesi. Monetary policy tick-by-tick. Working paper, University of
Chicago, Chicago, IL, 2005.
A. T. Foerster, P.-D. G. Sarte, and M. W. Watson. Sectoral vs. aggregate shocks: A
structural factor analysis of industrial production. Journal of Political Economy, 119(1):
1–38, 2011.
T. Foucault and L. Fresard. Learning from peers’ stock prices and corporate investment.
Journal of Financial Economics, 111(3):554–577, 2014.
X. Gabaix. The granular origins of aggregate fluctuations. Econometrica, 79(3):733–772,
2011.
M. Giannetti, M. Burkart, and T. Ellingsen. What you sell is what you lend? explaining
trade credit contracts. Review of Financial Studies, 24(4):1261–1298, 2011.
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